

BOOK REVIEWS

CAROLE HILLENBRAND, *The Crusades: Islamic Perspectives* (Chicago and London: Fitzroy Dearborn, 1999). Pp. 704. \$125.00 cloth.

REVIEWED BY JONATHAN P. BERKEY, Department of History, Davidson College, Davidson, N.C.

This book is a comprehensive survey of the history of the Crusades—comprehensive, that is, from the standpoint of the sources left by the Crusaders' enemies. The author sets out to reconstruct for a Western audience what the available Muslim sources (for the most part, in Arabic) tell us about the Crusading phenomenon: how the Muslims viewed and responded to the challenge presented to them by the European Christian holy warriors who suddenly appeared on the Near Eastern scene at the end of the 11th century. In this respect it is not unlike Amin Maalouf's *The Crusades Through Arab Eyes*, although compared to the earlier volume the present book is simultaneously less narrative and more exhaustive, even encyclopedic.

After a Prologue, the book begins with a discussion of "the Muslims' initial reactions to the coming of the Franks" and, in two succeeding chapters, of the development and realization of the Muslim ideology of jihad during the period from the First Crusade to the fall of Acre in 1291. Two further chapters confront Muslim stereotypes of the Franks and "aspects of life in the Levant" during the period. Inevitably, Hillenbrand draws heavily here on Usama ibn Munqidh's famous "memoir," although it is refreshing to read her carefully skeptical approach to that oft-quoted and rarely analyzed source. Many of us who write on the social and cultural history of the Islamic Near East in this period are inclined to pass over military matters with little comment; we would all be well advised to read the chapters on "the conduct of war," and especially on "armies, arms, armour and fortifications," simply as a reminder of the centrality of military organization, martial arts, and fortifications to the regimes that dominated the medieval Muslim societies of the Near East. The book concludes with an Epilogue in which the author draws attention to echoes of medieval Muslim resistance to the Crusades in a series of disparate modern phenomena, from Saddam Hussein's characterization of himself as a latter-day Saladin to the conscious and unconscious evocation of the anti-Crusader spirit in the ideologies of Islamist writers and political groups, from Sayyid Qutb to Hamas.

Although it is a meticulous piece of scholarship, the book is driven by political as much as purely academic motivations. The author self-consciously sets herself the goal of overcoming stereotypes and bridging the cultural gulf that pitted Crusaders against Muslims, and that has continued to separate the Crusaders' (possibly) more secular European and American heirs from the descendants of their enemies. Hence Hillenbrand's decision to base her reconstruction of events entirely on Muslim sources, with which her audience is presumably less familiar than Western accounts such as those of Joinville or William of Tyre. It is understandable, given Hillenbrand's stated goals, although it is also perhaps unfortunate, that this leads her to exclude Eastern (i.e., non-Latin) Christian sources from consideration, because indigenous Christians—not to mention Jews—also suffered from the Crusaders' parochial zeal. There are moments when the author seems to identify rather closely with her subjects. But she is also driven by a keen desire to be fair and judicious and so does not refrain from observing the Muslims at their worst as well as their best—as, for example, in her acknowledgment of "the longevity and

unchanging nature of the negative perceptions of the peoples of Western Europe” (p. 257), which the Muslims absorbed as a result of their two centuries of interaction with the Crusaders.

Hillenbrand expects that her book will be of value “primarily for students and the general public,” although she expresses the hope that “specialists will also find something of interest in it” (p. 2). In that she is perhaps overly modest—or overly ambitious, depending on your perspective. A few pages into the first chapter, the reader is immersed in a complex discussion of what various unpublished Muslim sources have to say about possible collusion between the Fatimid caliphs in Egypt and the leaders of the First Crusade. That discussion is a very useful and enlightening one, but it is a little difficult to contemplate the “general public” following the argument or deriving much from it. The fact is that it is specialists, ranging from graduate and undergraduate students to university instructors, who will benefit most from this monumental and very informative book. The former, perhaps, will find the book a useful text for specialized courses on the Crusades; the latter will discover in it a veritable gold mine of information and riveting quotations for their lectures. The true value of the work is reflected in its organization. To some extent it is a reference work, and a clearly and handily organized one at that. Its “expanded contents list” (that is, a second and more detailed table of contents) goes on for four and a half dense pages, which makes it extremely easy to locate what the author (and her sources) have to say on any particular issue. A close look at the organization of the second chapter, for example, “The First Crusade and the Muslims’ Initial Reactions to the Coming of the Franks,” reveals that the book is not so much a sustained narrative as it is a series of discussions of discrete topics. This is not meant to imply that the book has no coherent analysis; it suggests that if you are looking for, say, valuable quotations from contemporary Arab poets’ reactions to the sudden arrival of the Crusading Franks, you should have no trouble tracking them down.

The book is lavishly illustrated with hundreds of plates and figures. The illustrations sometimes seem only tangentially connected to the text—as, for example, on page 284, where a collection of drawings of motifs found on Mamluk-period coins is set amid a very interesting discussion, based in part on the insights of the theologian Mary Douglas, of “Frankish defilement of Islamic sacred space.” But at other points the juxtaposition of text and illustration constitutes one of the book’s most laudable features—as, for example, when Hillenbrand discusses Nur al-Din’s construction and endowment of religious monuments and their relationship to his conscious projection of an image of himself as a good Sunni ruler and *mujāhid*. On a similar subject, it is worth pointing out that the author makes exceptionally good use of a source that, after benefiting from the labors of an earlier generation of Orientalists, has often been overlooked by more recent social and cultural historians—namely, the extensive inscriptions on Crusader-era buildings.

For a book of this size and scope, there are some omissions that are a bit surprising. This reviewer, for example, would have liked to see more explicit attention to Sufism. Sufism was a distinctive feature of Islam as it was understood by those Muslims who confronted the Crusaders—Saladin, who of course figures quite prominently here, was a generous although not uncritical benefactor of the mystics—but as a discrete topic of investigation the Sufi tradition is all but absent from this book. This should not, however, in any way detract from Hillenbrand’s achievement. Earlier I compared her book to Maalouf’s *The Crusades Through Arab Eyes*. Another work that inevitably comes to mind is Francesco Gabrieli’s still serviceable collection of translated texts, *Arab Historians of the Crusades*. In so far as Hillenbrand’s book is a direct witness to the observations and insights of those medieval Muslims who wrote about the Crusaders and their campaigns, there is of course some overlap between the two volumes. But several things distinguish this work from the earlier one. In the first place, Hillenbrand has sifted through a much larger array of texts than are represented in Gabrieli’s volume, including unpublished manuscripts as well as poetry, sermons, and longer works of narrative fiction, such

as the *Sirat Baybars*. Second, her book is far more than a simple repository of snippets from Muslim texts. It is informed throughout by a desire to understand the nature of the cross-cultural encounter between Crusader and Muslim and its impact on the Muslim world. In this the author draws on and synthesizes much recent research not just on the Crusades, but also on medieval Islamic social and cultural history, such as Emmanuel Sivan's path-breaking *L'Islam et la croisade*, and introduces Western readers to recent discussions (both scholarly and political) of the subject by contemporary Arab writers. Here, I think, the "political" purpose to which I drew attention earlier is made to serve the purposes of scholarship, and to very good effect.

MANUELA MARIN, ED., *The Formation of al-Andalus. Part 1: History and Society*, The Formation of the Classical Islamic World (Hampshire, U.K.: Ashgate Publishing, 1998). Pp. 529.

MARIBEL FIERRO AND JULIO SAMSÓ, ED., *The Formation of al-Andalus. Part 2: Language, Religion, Culture and the Sciences*, The Formation of the Classical Islamic World (Hampshire, U.K.: Ashgate Publishing, 1998). Pp. 524.

REVIEWED BY JANINA SAFRAN, Department of History, Penn State University, University Park

As Lawrence I. Conrad explains in the general editor's Preface, the intention of the series, *The Formation of the Classical Islamic World*, is to present a critical selection of previously published articles on an aspect of the formative period of Islam, defined as A.D. 600–950. Each of the volumes is edited by an expert in a field of Islamic studies and is meant to serve as an introduction to the state of knowledge of a given topic and significant debates within the scholarship, conveying a variety of approaches. The two volumes under review here have a geographical rather than a thematic focus and together present forty articles on a range of topics having to do with the first three centuries of Islam on the Iberian peninsula. The two volumes on *The Formation of al-Andalus* are meant to be read together. "Part 1: History and Society" and "Part 2: Language, Religion, Culture and the Sciences" share overlapping themes, and their references and bibliographies are complementary.

The Formation of al-Andalus is designed to make Spanish scholarship on al-Andalus accessible to English readers. Most of the articles are translated into English from Spanish, although we also find a few articles originally written in French and English, and many were published in journals, collections, and publications that are not always readily available in American libraries. The articles selected are meant to reflect the production and interests of Spanish research on al-Andalus, especially over the past twenty years, and through their prolific references to monographic works and debates beyond the scope of the series they open vistas for further investigation, as do the bibliographies provided at the end of each introduction. The volumes are thus invaluable for immersion into a particular world of research but, by the same token, may not appeal to the more general reader interested in Islamic Iberia. The volume titles may be misleading for those looking for a comprehensive, encyclopedic approach to al-Andalus; they would do well to turn to *The Legacy of Muslim Spain* (ed. Salma Khadra Jayyusi, 2 vols. [Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1994]).

In the Introduction to Part 1, Manuela Marin presents a helpful, brief synopsis of Spanish historiography and its treatment of al-Andalus. As she explains: "al-Andalus was, for many years, studied not for what it was but for what it represented in the history of Spain" (p. xviii). All the articles selected for the volume represent a movement away from the concept of "Spanish Islam," with its emphasis on the uniqueness of Islam in Iberia, itself a reaction to the rejection of "the Islamic element in the [Spanish] national culture." The shift to a more "neutral" approach is characterized by a shift in terminology from "Muslim Spain" to "al-Andalus"

and embraces a more sophisticated investigation of questions of continuity and discontinuity in Iberia. The organization of the first volume progresses thematically, if haltingly, from the subjects of conquest and settlement to social groups and structure, to cities, to the frontier, and, finally, to various institutions such as the “zalmedina” (*ṣāhib al-madīna*), the ceremonial of the caliphate, the family. Cumulatively, they provide the reader with a sketch of important developments in society and politics during a formative period.

The sources available for the study of the history and society of al-Andalus in this period are limited, and most of the articles in the first volume reflect two approaches to their study. A number of articles follow a cautious approach with limited conclusions. For example, the first article, “The Itineraries of the Muslim Conquest of al-Andalus in the Light of a New Source: Ibn al-Shabbat,” by Emilio de Santiago Simón (1971), situates a “new” source in the historiography and provides an example of source criticism. The second article, by María Jesús Viguera Molíns (1995), updates the historiographical discussion of the first with a very useful descriptive list of the extant Arabic chronicles relevant to a study of the Islamic conquest of al-Andalus.

Other articles tackle grander themes, building their arguments on more speculative treatment of the evidence or lack of evidence, and provide more stimulating reading. For example, Pierre Guichard tackles the problem of the ethnic identity of the population of eastern al-Andalus in this period in light of the few references to the region in the extant histories and the limited evidence of the biographical literature. He challenges the convention that the Levantine plains were “Arabicized and urbanized” and develops a hypothesis that eastern al-Andalus supported an early and relatively important population of Berbers (“The Population of the Region of Valencia During the First Two Centuries of Muslim Domination,” 1968). Guichard’s interests in the ethnic mapping of al-Andalus and the origins and development of social institutions have been profoundly influential, and a number of scholars in this volume and elsewhere build on and critique his work. This in part explains the selection of an essay that is now more than thirty years old.

Mikel de Epalza’s article “Mozarabs: An Emblematic Christian Minority in Islamic al-Andalus,” first published in the Jayyusi volume (1994), provides another example of the more speculative approach. After discussing terminology and the protected status of Christians as *ahl al-dhimma*, the author develops an argument for the early (8th century) mass conversion of Christians to Islam in rural al-Andalus, in the absence of direct evidence. In his view, the paucity of references to Christian population centers describes their decline and does not simply reflect the lack of interest of the Arabic chronicles in the affairs of the Christian population. He then argues that institutional limitations—a shortage of priests, monks, and bishops—saw the loss of rural Christian communities to Islam. Without baptism, administered by an ordained priest with holy oil consecrated by a bishop, and bishoprics, Christian communities could not be sustained. Those who retained Christian traditions but were not properly baptized were not, he argues, considered Christian, and hence became Muslim. Although the reader may or may not find the argument persuasive, the essay invites a reconsideration of Richard Bulliet’s theory of conversion as applied to al-Andalus and assumptions about urban versus rural conversion. It also raises interesting questions about religious and communal identity and the implications of early and large-scale conversion for our understanding of intercommunal relations.

Two other essays of note in the first volume are Barceló’s “The Manifest Caliph: Umayyad Ceremony in Córdoba, or the Staging of Power” (1991) and Maribel Fierro’s, “Four Questions in Connection with Ibn Hafsun.” Barceló develops a guide to the staging of caliphal receptions based on the extant portion of Ibn Hayyan’s recension of ʿIsa al-Razi’s chronicle on the reign of the second Umayyad caliph, al-Hakam II. Although the focus on the “staging” of participants in formal receptions results in a rather static treatment of court ceremonial, the article must be

considered in the discussion of caliphal power and legitimacy, court life, and the definition of offices such as the chamberlain (*hājib*) in al-Andalus.

Fierro's article "Four Questions in Connection with Ibn Hafsun" is unique in the series. She poses four questions as a way to promote a discourse with Manuel Ación Almansa's monograph *Entre el feudalismo y el Islam: 'Umar ibn Hafsun en los historiadores, en las fuentes y en la historia* (Jaén, 1994). This form of critique is intended to extend beyond a book review to stimulate further consideration of the context, character, and significance of Ibn Hafsun's (d. 918) rebellion and, more generally, different approaches to Andalusī history. Ación, interested in the grand scheme of economic, social, and political change in al-Andalus, develops the argument that Ibn Hafsun's rebellion expressed the resistance of Visigothic "rent-lords" to the imposition of the new Islamic order. Fierro, while appreciative of Ación's innovative theory, presents a careful re-evaluation of some of the evidence that undermines important elements of his argument and offers a different perspective on the rebellion.

The introduction to the second volume presents a succinct essay on the culture of al-Andalus in the first four centuries, with sections on language, religion, intellectual and artistic developments, and the exact and natural sciences—the titles of the sections of the volume. The introduction thus provides a framework for the articles that follow, with some noteworthy criticisms and elaborations. For example, the introduction demonstrates the contribution of Hussain Monés's frequently cited article, "The Role of Men of Religion in the History of Muslim Spain up to the End of the Caliphate," but also argues against the author's description of Maliki jurists in al-Andalus as "rigid, fanatical and intolerant." The criticism is based on an assessment of the evidence but also explains the context of Monés's "essentialist position."

The articles in the first half of the second volume expand the perspectives on history and society presented in the first volume. Here again we find authors confronting the challenges of limited evidence by offering hypotheses as they strive to address important questions, but more commonly by reporting on specific authors or texts or by tracing the history and composition of important sectors of society. The prospective reader should bear in mind that the division of articles into categories does not mean that the volume provides a comprehensive survey or the seminal work of any particular field. For example, there is only one article under the subheading "Art and Architecture," Manuel Ocaña Jiménez's "The Basilica of San Vicente and the Great Mosque of Córdoba: A New Look at the Sources" (1942). Indeed, most of the articles, whether focusing on language, the ulema, mysticism, philosophy, literature, or historiography, are about men of religion and religion and society. Few of the articles (in either volume) explicitly explore intercommunal relations, but the reader will certainly catch numerous views of the multi-ethnic, multi-confessional, multi-cultural milieu.

The second half of the second volume covers the exact and natural sciences: astronomy, mathematics, and medicine and pharmacology. The articles are descriptive of genres of scientific writing such as calendars and books of *anwā'*, or describe individual texts such as 'Abd al-Malik ibn Habib's *Book on the Stars*, Qasim ibn Mutarrif al-Qattan's *Kitāb al-hay'a*, Sa'īd ibn 'Abd Rabbihi's *Urjūza fī l-tibb*, and Ibn Juljul's "Treatise on Medicaments," or report more generally on the work of particular authors such as Maslama of Madrid. Articles on "Indian Astronomy in al-Andalus" and "Medicine in al-Andalus until the Fall of the Caliphate" similarly tend to describe authors and works rather than develop specific arguments or perspectives on their subjects. The articles are informative and learned but do not excite much inspiration for the lay person.

The two volumes of *The Formation of al-Andalus* provide a great service by introducing the serious student of al-Andalus to a large number of the Spanish (and French) scholars in different fields who have dedicated themselves to the investigation of a range of topics. Not a few of the articles should be of interest to scholars of medieval Islamic studies whose primary interest

is not necessarily al-Andalus. Their shortcomings have much to do with the constraints on the editors (and are anticipated by them). The coherence of the volumes is defined by time and place and hence is not bound very tightly. The articles may be representative of each scholar's research but may not be examples of their best work (the reader is directed to look at their monographs where possible). The editorial interest in historiographical development means some of the articles are out of date; the reader is advised to check the date of original publication of each article, listed at the beginning of each volume. The rationale of the series and the objectives of this particular collection tend to give *The Formation of al-Andalus* a conservative quality.

ŞEVKET PAMUK, *A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire*, Cambridge Studies in Islamic Civilization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). Pp. 301. \$69.95 cloth.

REVIEWED BY STEPHEN P. BLAKE, Department of History, St. Olaf College, Northfield, Minn.

The title of Şevket Pamuk's book is misleading. Far from restricting himself to monetary phenomena—interest rates, coinage, inflation, and availability of specie—the author has chosen to cast his study of money during the Ottoman period (1300–1918) in the widest possible terms. Viewing some of the crucial issues of Ottoman economic and political history through a monetary lens has produced new and interesting insights—in some cases, the result is a revision of old arguments—but on other matters, Pamuk has produced provocative new hypotheses. Furthermore, the book offers a timely addition to the rapidly developing field of global history. Although most of Pamuk's comparative remarks relate to early modern Europe, his study establishes a benchmark against which the analyses of monetary and economic phenomena in the other two early modern Middle Eastern states—the Mughal and the Safavid—can be measured.

As the starting point for his discussion of the state's impact on monetary and fiscal matters, Pamuk appropriates Mehmet Genç's framework. Genç had argued that three principles guided the Ottoman bureaucracy's economic policies. The first, provisioning the urban economy, involved supplying, for the most part, the soldiers, officers, and officials resident in Istanbul, the imperial capital. Second, the Ottoman state needed a steady stream of revenue, which it obtained from a wide variety of agrarian and urban taxes. Third, the Ottomans were committed to maintaining the traditional order of society—a hierarchy in which the sultan and the bureaucracy stood well above the commercial and laboring groups (peasants, artisans, and merchants). In addition to providing a structure for the analysis of the Ottoman Empire, these principles furnish a comparative framework: to what extent did they guide the economic policies of the Mughal and Safavid states?

One of the most important issues for Pamuk is monetization. By the end of the 15th century the urban areas in both the Balkans and Anatolia had become largely monetized, and a cash nexus had begun to penetrate the countryside. During the 16th century, the rapid commercialization of the rural economy and the increasing availability of specie sparked the use of money throughout the empire. The state's revenue demand—in both the rural and urban areas—was for the most part denominated in cash, and payments in kind were becoming increasingly rare. It is in this context of expanding monetization and increasing trade—primarily from India and Iran to Europe—that Pamuk discusses coinage, exchange rates, and the development of credit. In the early modern Middle East, the Ottoman Empire seems to have achieved this critical level of monetization earlier than either of its two contemporaries.

Pamuk devotes a good part of his book—six of the fourteen chapters—to the topic of currency debasement. The author's treatment of this issue, carefully distinguishing among the several debasements, is an example of the sophistication and careful analysis of the book as a

whole. For Mehmed II (1444–81), the architect of the early state, debasements were a regular means of revenue enhancement rather than a response to fiscal crisis. The other two major interventions in the currency system (of 1585–86 and 1808–34), however, were responses of the state to economic crisis. In the late 16th century, the debasements were primarily an answer to the political and economic difficulties brought about by the ruinous wars with the Safavids in the east and the Hapsburgs in the west. By contrast, the monetary difficulties of the early 19th century derived from the costs associated with the political, economic, and military reforms of Mahmud II (1808–39).

In an extremely valuable chapter, Pamuk revisits the arguments surrounding the price revolution of the 16th century and its impact on the Ottoman Empire. This debate, which originated in the context of early modern European history and which has exercised a good many Ottoman historians, has not really grabbed the attention of the economic historians of the Safavid and Mughal empires. Pamuk begins by surveying the latest developments in the historiography of early modern Europe. (A strength of the book is the author's mastery of the latest theoretical literature.) Taking his lead from this research, Pamuk suggests that the price increases of the 16th and 17th centuries were not caused primarily by an increased supply of new world silver (as earlier historians such as Omar Barkan argued), but were rather the result of a long-term change in the demand for money (the velocity of circulation) due to increases in population, urbanization, and monetization. The need to finance larger central armies and to underwrite long and exhaustive wars in both the east and the west were, Pamuk argues, the more likely causes for the fiscal and economic crises of the Ottoman state in the 16th century.

Pamuk's book, as I have suggested, raises a number of interesting comparative issues. Take monetization, for example. The first appearance in the late 16th century of a comprehensive list of crop rates suggests that the Mughal state trailed the Ottoman by at least fifty years in the implementation of a monetized revenue system. And the Safavids seem to have followed the Mughals by another seventy-five to one hundred years or so. Pamuk also argues that the Ottoman state was more inclined to intervene in economic and monetary matters than were its counterparts in early modern Europe. A brief glance at India and Iran suggests that this generalization probably holds for the Mughal and Safavid states, as well. These two empires—despite sporadic attempts at fixing prices in urban markets and monopolizing the trade in certain commodities (silk for the Safavids and indigo for the Mughals)—adopted a much more *laissez faire* attitude toward economic and monetary issues. As for the price revolution of the 16th century, this has not been a major issue in the study of either early modern India or Iran. Because reliable information on price trends has not been available to Mughal and Safavid historians, they have not been able to make trustworthy judgments on rates of inflation.

Pamuk discusses credit and finance in the Ottoman Empire in the larger context of the Islamic prohibition against usury, setting out the strategies and procedures developed to circumvent this restriction. Here again the contrast with the Mughal and Safavid states is striking. Populous, rich, and productive, early modern India had a highly developed financial sector that relied heavily on the skills and experience of the Hindu merchant and banking classes. Iran also boasted a sophisticated non-Islamic financial community (composed of Armenian and Hindu merchants and bankers), and thus the Islamic prohibitions had very little impact on the Safavid economy.

Extensive work in the Ottoman archives characterizes Pamuk's study. A rich resource for all aspects of Ottoman history, the archives offer research possibilities unavailable to historians of the Mughal and Safavid states. For example, Pamuk consulted 3,000 price-list registers from three Istanbul courts in investigating the Ottoman government's intervention in the urban economy; he studied credit relationships in the 16th and 17th centuries by means of the court cases pitting creditors against debtors; and, in examining the provincial law codes of the 15th and 16th centuries, he uncovered a network of exchange relationships in the hierarchy of markets

linking countryside and city. In the Mughal and Safavid empires, on the other hand, the bulk of the archival and documentary materials were lost in the chaos and destruction of the early 18th century. As a result, the economic history of both early modern India and Iran has been written using, for the most part, the records of the European East India companies—the English and especially the Dutch. In sum, Pamuk's book offers fresh and provocative insights into a number of topics in Ottoman economic history while, at the same time, providing Mughal and Safavid historians with stimulating new questions and lines of inquiry.

STEFAN C. REIF, *A Jewish Archive from Old Cairo: The History of Cambridge University's Genizah Collection* (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon, 2000). Pp. 297. \$65.00 cloth, \$29.95 paper.

REVIEWED BY NORMAN A. STILLMAN, Department of History, University of Oklahoma, Norman.

It is, to say the least, rather startling that prior to the appearance of this new book by Stefan Reif, who is professor of Medieval Hebrew Studies at Cambridge University in England, the director of the Genizah Research Unit, and head of the Oriental Division at the University Library, there simply was no detailed history of the discovery of the Cairo Genizah and its transfer abroad. Neither had there been a convenient single survey of the broad range of its contents, nor a comprehensive *mise au point* of the century of scholarship in so many disciplines that has resulted from this unique treasure trove. Brief introductory sketches existed in the works of Paul Kahle and S. D. Goitein, and Norman Golb surveyed the first half-century of Genizah scholarship more than forty years ago in the journal *Judaism* (1957). But none of these provided the wealth of detail to be found in *A Jewish Archive from Old Cairo*.

As the subtitle indicates, the book deals primarily with Cambridge University's Genizah collection. Since the Taylor–Schechter Collection was brought to Europe by Solomon Schechter, the father of Genizah studies, and makes up the largest single collection by far of texts (at about 140,000 items, or more than half of all known Genizah papers), the history of the Cambridge collection is the focal point of Genizah history. Furthermore, Reif does not neglect mention of others in the 19th century who took Geniza manuscripts from Egypt, such as Abraham Firkovitch and Elkan Adler, whose collections ended up in St. Petersburg and New York City, respectively.

In the first four chapters of the book, Reif describes with zest the story of the Genizah itself: the early travelers who visited it and the famous story of Schechter's encounter with the Scottish twin sisters who had returned from a trip to Egypt with what Schechter immediately recognized to be manuscript pages from the lost Hebrew original of the apocryphal book of Ben Sira (Ecclesiasticus). Reif provides colorful and intimate portraits of the people at Cambridge who played a role in aiding and supporting Schechter's own expedition to Egypt and those who worked with him back at the university, such as Charles Taylor and Francis Jenkinson—or who opposed him in scholarly polemic when he returned, such as David Margoliouth. He also describes with apparent relish the rivalry between Schechter and his colleagues and their counterpart scholars at Oxford. As a proud Cantabrigian, Reif also provides a brief historical sketch of his university's long association with Hebraic studies, its resistance to Jewish scholars, and the ambiance in which Schechter and his Jewish colleagues had to work. These initial four chapters combine an erudite history of scholars and scholarly detective work with juicy internal university gossip and make for absorbing reading.

In Chapters 5–9, Reif turns to the actual contents as they have been revealed and analyzed by scholars over the past century. Each chapter is followed by an extremely valuable reader's

guide to the apposite literature. Chapter 5 deals with what the Genizah provides for the study of the Hebrew Bible. The Genizah sheds light on such important issues as the transmission of the text, the evolution and technical details of the production of biblical codices, the development of vocalization systems, and the eventual triumph of the Tiberian sublinear vowel points for the Masoretic text. In addition to a wealth of information on the Hebrew Bible, the Genizah is also a rich source of data on Jewish Bible translations in Aramaic (*Targumim*) and in Arabic, the most famous of the latter being Sa'adya Gaon's *Tafsir*, which became the standard Judeo-Arabic translation throughout the Middle Ages. Biblical exegesis—Rabbinic and Karaite—are also richly represented. Reif points out that the Genizah's contents were not limited to the Hebrew Bible and its Jewish translations and commentaries. There were also Syriac and Greek Christian biblical manuscripts dating from the 5th to 9th centuries—that is, predating the Genizah itself. The latter were to be found on palimpsests, recycled sheets of vellum, or paper, on which Hebrew texts were written over the imperfectly erased originals.

Chapter 6 deals with what the Genizah has provided on the history of rabbinic literature—the Babylonian and Palestinian Talmuds, the development of the prayer service, the earliest liturgical poetry (*piyyutim*) from the Byzantine period, queries and response, post-Talmudic legal literature, and finally the rich poetic compositions of the Middle Ages. Reif points out the astounding fact the Geniza increased the previously known 40,000 medieval Hebrew poems by 150 percent.

The next chapter, "Politics, Places and Personalities," covers a wide variety of topics, ranging from interfaith relations, Karaite sectarianism, and the Khazars, to the rise of competing centers of Jewish scholarship and authority, and Jewish communities in Palestine. It also provides vignettes of such figures as Sa'adya Gaon, Judah ha-Levi, and Moses Maimonides. Sundry topics such as the use of Arabic script (as opposed to Hebrew script for writing not only Arabic, but also, in the case of the Karaites for a certain period, Hebrew) and pilgrimages. Of all of the book's ten chapters, this one is the least holistic thematically and is perhaps somewhat dizzying for the reader.

In Chapter 8, Reif zestfully surveys some aspects of medieval Jewish life that are illuminated by the Genizah manuscripts. The chapter begins with piquant quotations from selected manuscripts that range from a woman's complaint about her husband's sexual inadequacy to a parent's request to a teacher that his child not be spanked for being late for class, and there are equally fascinating excerpts from documents throughout. Aspects of marriage, the dynamics of male-female relationships, the education of children (adult education is mentioned only *en passant*), and glimpses of business, taxation, and synagogue affairs are briefly taken up. The chapter concludes with a section on medicine and magic. The only thing that this reviewer found wanting in this delightful vademecum through quotidian life was some mention of the material culture that is so richly represented in the Genizah. Although one cannot expect each and every area of the day-to-day to be covered in a succinct survey such as this, our knowledge concerning such realia as food, clothing, and the home and its furnishings has been immensely enriched by the Genizah documents. A number of eminent scholars have produced a significant corpus of publications accessible to both an academic and more general educated audience based on their Geniza research on material culture. Thus, some brief mention of this fundamental aspect of daily life is very much missed here.

In Chapter 9, intriguingly titled "Bookish and Lettered," Reif takes up a variety of inter-related topics concerning language, literacy, and the technical aspects of book production. In several instances, he returns to subjects treated earlier in the book, such as children's education and the evolution from scrolls to codices. Rather than being redundant, Reif discusses different aspects and expanded details. He clearly and succinctly explains the linguistic situation in which educated Jews in the medieval Islamic world were literate in three Semitic languages—Hebrew, Aramaic, and Arabic—which contributed to their advances in the fields of grammar, philology,

and lexicography. He also surveys the Jewish diasporic languages represented in the Genizah, which included not only Judeo-Arabic but also Judeo-Greek, Judeo-Persian, Ladino, and even Yiddish.

The final chapter provides a brief but pithy (almost breathtakingly so) overview of the progress in cataloguing, preserving, and researching the Cambridge Genizah collection in the century after Schechter.

Aimed at the non-Genizah specialist, whether academic or the general educated reader, this book strikes a perfect balance between scholarly and popular presentation. It is richly illustrated with some sixty color and black-and-white plates of superior quality. The many plates of Genizah manuscripts are among the finest that this reviewer has seen in published works.

Professor Reif has performed a great service in writing this unique and comprehensive survey. It will make an excellent textbook and reference work for students.

PAUL STEPHENSON, *Byzantium's Balkan Frontier: A Political Study of the Northern Balkans, 900–1204* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000). Pp. 364. \$74.95.

REVIEWED BY MARK BARTUSIS, Department of History, Northern State University, Aberdeen, S.D.

Perhaps the Byzantine Empire's most significant achievement during its thousand-year history was the civilizing of its northern neighbors, the Slavs, through Christianization and political tutelage. The process was not entirely altruistic; rather, it was designed to secure the empire's northern border against the Slavs and other peoples. This border shifted over time, sometimes embracing the entire Balkan peninsula as far as the Danube to modern Croatia, sometimes comprising little more than the Thracian littoral and a few isolated areas in the south of the Greek peninsula.

In this book, Paul Stephenson presents "a narrative of Byzantine activity in the northern Balkans through three centuries with emphasis on political and military matters" (p. 6) and attempts to describe "the nature of Byzantine influence and authority in each of the frontier regions in the northern Balkans" (p. 7) in order to determine "how and why the line of the Byzantine frontier in the northern Balkans changed so dramatically between 900 and 1204" and "the probable ramifications of those changes for the peoples settled beyond or within the shifting frontiers" (p. 17). The study begins with the era of Bulgarian dominance in the northern Balkans and ends with the Fourth Crusade, when the balance of power in the area was forever altered. Geographically, the book focuses on the area from the Danube in the north to the line of latitude more or less marked by Thessaloniki in the south.

After an introductory chapter in which he catalogues the various peoples who were players in 10th-century Balkan affairs (Bulgarians, Serbs, Croats, the Dalmatian cities, Pechenegs, Rus, and Magyars), the author retells the story of the Byzantine conquest of Bulgaria from the accession of Nikephoros II Phokas in 963 to the death of Basil II (the "Bulgarslayer") in 1025. As Stephenson notes, these first two chapters are "an introduction to lands, peoples, and *thematata* which will be developed in considering the subsequent period" (p. 8).

Chapter 3 focuses on Byzantine fortunes along the lower Danube (Paristrion) following the death of Basil II, the loss of the area to the nomadic Pechenegs, and its recovery under Alexios I Komnenos. The next chapter deals with the Adriatic coast, the Serbs, and Bulgaria during the same period. Chapter 5 discusses the area of Albania during the reign of Alexios I (1081–1118) in light of the threat to Byzantine authority posed by the Normans of southern Italy and the Venetians. Special attention is paid to the First Crusade. Chapter 6 is concerned with the strug-

gles among Byzantium, Venice, and Hungary to control Croatia and the adjacent Dalmatian coast during the second half of the reign of Alexios I and that of his son John I (1118–43).

Chapters 7 and 8 deal with the long reign of Manuel I Komnenos (1143–80). Here, in the author's words, the text "is at its fullest" (p. 8). For decades, this emperor schemed with or against or fought the German emperors, the Normans, and Hungary to extend Byzantine control successfully over Dalmatia, Bosnia, Sirmium, and Raška in the northwestern Balkans. The impact of the Second Crusade on the Balkans is treated in some detail. In Chapter 9, Stephenson describes the collapse of Byzantine control over the northern Balkans from the death of Manuel I through the Fourth Crusade (1204). He recounts the invasions by the Normans and Hungarians and the revolts of Bulgarians, Serbs, and Vlachs.

In a seven-page concluding chapter, Stephenson writes that the goal of the emperors was not to establish "a fully functioning administration across the whole Balkan peninsula" but "to ensure the integrity of the empire's core lands in the face of diverse internal and external threats" (p. 317). He concludes that while the advance and retreat of Byzantium's Balkan frontier in 900–1204 ostensibly supports George Ostrogorsky's theme of "Apogee and Disintegration," it is unwarranted to speak of an onerous "Byzantine Yoke" under which the leaders or peoples of the Balkans endeavored to free themselves (p. 316). He argues that Byzantine control in the northern Balkans was generally weak and downplays political and ethnic nationalism (p. 320). Byzantium's loss of the northern Balkans was the result more of the rise of Western powers—Venice, Hungary, the Norman kingdom, the German empire, and Rome—than to native Balkan aspirations (pp. 320–21).

Stephenson is erudite. He knows the sources and their limitations. His knowledge of modern scholarship is considerable, extending to the extensive scholarship written in Serbo-Croatian (an inability to use this scholarship is a frequent shortcoming of Western scholars). Further, throughout the work the author makes productive use of archaeological evidence—architecture, pottery, and especially coins and lead seals. He displays a familiarity with the literary sources to consider the Byzantine conception of frontiers and borders.

Any book that tries to deal with a variety of geographical areas century by century is going to face hurdles in organization. Stephenson's work fails in this regard. The poor organization of the book is evident from the number of parenthetical references in the text directing the reader to other sections of the book—for example, "(see above at pp. 84–6)" (p. 194). On average, such cross-references appear on every third page. The twenty-nine pages of Chapter 5 contain eleven such references. On one page (259) there are four. In addition, the author is enamored of the phrases "as we have seen" and "as we will see." In the space of one section of six pages, he uses one of these phrases seven times (pp. 276–81), with a crowning "as we have seen, and will see again" four pages later. Further, despite this extensive cross-referencing the narrative is quite disjointed. Each chapter comprises about nine sections, each with its own subheading. The first sentence of each section begins like the opening sentence of a separate article, with no continuity from the preceding paragraph. Consequently, much of the text reads like a series of extended footnotes.

The writing style is adequate, if dry, with an absence of human interest and drama. There is an irritating use of parenthetical citations throughout the text that hinders literary continuity—for example, "The first type of amphora discovered at Dinogetia (Ştefan et al. 1967: 247–57, Figure 154) corresponds to Saraçhane type 54 (Hayes 1992: 73–74)" (pp. 84–85, where in one paragraph there are seven such references). At times, subtlety of interpretation overwhelms the material. For example, while discussing rebellions against Byzantine rule, Stephenson writes that "the principal means to galvanize popular support for a secessionist movement was to appeal to the common memory of an independent ruler of the northern Balkans, whose authority resided in the title 'emperor of the Bulgarians'" (pp. 143–4). The meaning of this statement

is relatively clear, but in his concluding chapter he writes, “Similarly, while it is clear that Slavic and non-Slavic peoples, including Bulgarians, Serbs and Croats, Albanians and Vlachs, were aware of, indeed actively constructed their own distinct identities, sources do not support the notion that such an ethnic awareness, still less a national consciousness, motivated rebellions. The most we can say is that a sense of *Wirgefüh* was exploited as a galvanizing force by rebels seeking to extend their support base. In the case of Samuel Cometopulos [the future tsar] the appeal was to a common sense of ‘Bulgarianness,’ drawing on the political traditions of the realm ruled by Symeon and Peter” (p. 320). With an appeal to a foreign term and a neologism, the passage is so nuanced that it is difficult to know what the author is getting at.

There are numerous editorial lapses. On one page, Stephenson writes “the imperial treasury: the *phoundax*,” and on the next page, “the imperial depot (*phoundax*)” (pp. 99–100). Speaking of the proposed marriage between Anna, the daughter of Alexios I Komnenos, and Constantine Doukas, Stephenson writes that Anna “expected to succeed her father as Constantine’s empress” (p. 206). There are problems with grammar (“each retained power within their own lands” [p. 123]) and typos (e.g., pp. 305, 331, 333). On a map, the town of Vize in Thrace is placed on the Black Sea coast (p. 20).

Overall, Stephenson’s dissertation was not worth making into a book. I would recommend this book as a reference work, except for the fact that the eight-page index is inadequate (e.g., the author makes numerous references to the battle of Levunium, but the word is not indexed). The book will be most useful to scholars who need chronological and other details of the campaigns of John I and Manuel I Komnenos, but these might as profitably consult the author’s articles on these subjects. The less specialized reader should read Dimitri Obolensky’s *Byzantine Commonwealth* (2000 [1971]), which, as Stephenson notes, “is still the best analysis of Byzantine concerns in the northern Balkans and beyond” (p. 8), or John Fine’s books *The Early Medieval Balkans* (1983) and *The Late Medieval Balkans* (1987), or even Andrew Urbansky’s *Byzantium and the Danube Frontier* (1968), which the author does not cite.

NIKOLAI TODOROV, *Society, the City and Industry in the Balkans, 15th–19th Centuries* (Aldershot: Ashgate Variorum, 1998).

REVIEWED BY ISA BLUMI, Department of History and Hagop Kevorkian Center for Middle East Studies, New York University

This collection of essays, the latest in a long list of collected works put together by Variorum’s Studies in East–Central Europe, 1500–1900, is supposed to give the reader a broad range of Nikolai Todorov’s lifetime work. Todorov’s contribution to the field is not in doubt, although this collection hardly does justice to that contribution. The fourteen separate articles often overlap in theme, and on one occasion they almost reproduce the same article, as they span a period that reaches back to Todorov’s early career in Bulgaria (1964–92). The essays somewhat misplace Todorov’s importance to the field, as most of the language appropriated has become outdated with the collapse of the Bulgarian institutions that funded Todorov’s research until 1989. I would like to think Todorov can survive the fall of historical materialism.

Unfortunately, we are left, in the year 2001, a little more than unimpressed with the jargon-filled narrative about Balkan and Ottoman feudalism and the progressive emergence of an indigenous bourgeoisie. The teleological structure meant to legitimize Bulgarian communism overshadows at times more useful articles that withstand the ideological changes of the past decade. If one overlooks Chapters 1, 2, and 3, which are largely descriptive and are far too general and repetitive, the reader will be compensated with more of Todorov’s obvious strengths as an empiricist and his contribution to the field. The fourth chapter, “The City in the Bulgarian

Lands from the Fifteenth to the Nineteenth Century,” gives the reader a hint of Todorov’s strengths. Todorov published an extended study on the Balkan city in 1983, using some of the wealth of primary material available to the historian in Bulgaria. This fourth chapter, although largely summary in nature, gives us a good idea of the author’s understanding of the complexities of Ottoman urban life.

Continuing with more general observations that do not necessarily reflect the contents of this collection, the author is to be commended for generally avoiding the more familiar misrepresentations of the Ottoman period in the Balkans throughout his lifetime work and, to an extent, in these articles. In the more effective pieces, he provides the reader with a rich environment in which real lives interact in a dynamic that requires deeper research. Todorov is a rare breed in the post-war Balkans. Although he does weigh in, subtly, to promote certain official Bulgarian lines at play during the time of writing (there is a clear attempt to strengthen Bulgarian historical claims to the population in Macedonia, for instance, leaving the reader with no indication that the inhabitants of Macedonia think somewhat differently), his more detailed work is first-rate.

To the newcomer, Chapter 6, “The Demographic Situation in the Balkan Peninsula” (late 15th–early 16th century), will provide a decent summary of the central points of contention over the population of the early Ottoman period. (I recommend Cemal Kafadar’s book *Between Two Worlds* for a more interesting and complete summary.) The nineteen pages of charts that follow, however, are taken largely from the work of O. L. Barkan and do not seem particularly helpful to the novice. For those more attuned to the issues involved, they may simply refer to Barkan’s classic. Unfortunately, I find myself coming to this conclusion for most of the material in this collection. The novice will probably not learn anything that will withstand further reading, and those who are well read in the field will, with the exception perhaps of Chapters 3, 9, and 14 (depending on their interests), spend little time with this book. Chapter 8 is perhaps the most rewarding, because it uses Bulgaria’s unique resources (found in the Cyril and Methodius National Library in Sofia) to give us real and worthwhile insight into urban real estate in the Danube province in 1866. The material, visualized in clear charts, demonstrates Todorov’s ability to mine primary sources and collect details and numbers that are a real challenge to tabulate and organize. Such work is invaluable, and the time spent in putting such an article together is much appreciated. Unfortunately, there is not much more of this in the collection.

The chapter “The Budget of a Family of Bulgarian Workers in the Mid-19th Century” is a fascinating read and full of detail, but it is merely a summary of the work of two scholars—A. Daux and Le Play—who visited Samokov in 1848–49. Todorov does a wonderful job of extracting from the original piece and makes the material very interesting to read, but again, beyond the empirical strengths of this accumulation of “facts and figures,” I see no compelling reason to use this article. The chapter that follows, “Social Structures in the Balkans during the 18th and 19th Centuries,” suffers from its outdated emphasis on class analysis and historical inevitability, while Chapter 11 is a summation of consular reports sent from Greece in the 1840s. That the observations come from a Russian diplomat gives this piece some value and is unique in the French- and English-language secondary material available, so it is worth a look for those interested in the mid-century Greek economy. Chapter 14, “La participation des Bulgares à l’insurrection hétériste dans les principautés Danubiennes,” is another fine example of what Todorov can do, integrating Romanian, Russian, Bulgarian, and Greek primary and secondary material to provide insight into an otherwise unknown aspect of the Greek insurrection and its geographic, economic, and political scope.

The book’s summary approach reflects the fact that most of the material was taken from conference papers rather than Todorov’s extended works, most of which were published in Bulgarian. The articles are written either in French or English, and many of the citations are in Russian, Greek, or Bulgarian, demonstrating to those who are unaware that studying the Bal-

kans requires linguistic skills that far exceed the capacities of most human beings. On the whole, the book is a poor representation of what Todorov's contribution has been and speaks volumes to the fact that so little is being done to bring otherwise unknown historians to a wider, English-speaking audience. It is somewhat disappointing that the editors did not invest more in the book, electing to take these abridged pieces that on the whole contribute little to our appreciation of the Balkans in the Ottoman period. I do recommend taking a look at the few articles I noted as interesting reads; as for investing money to buy this book, I do not think that would be money well spent.

GERTRUDE BELL, *The Arabian Diaries, 1913–1914*, ed. Rosemary O'Brien (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2000). Pp. 273.

REVIEWED BY DANE KENNEDY, Department of History, George Washington University, Washington, D.C.

In December 1913, the English traveler and Orientalist Gertrude Bell set out from Damascus on a four-month journey that looped southeast through Arabia to the city of Hayyil, then north to Baghdad, and back across the Syrian desert to Damascus. The Syrian portion of the passage was already familiar to her, and she was not the first European to follow the caravan routes through Arabia. Charles Doughty and Wilfred and Anne Blunt, among others, had preceded her. Nor did her efforts significantly advance European knowledge of the region. But her willingness to undertake such an arduous and dangerous journey without European companions won her a gold medal from the Royal Geographical Society and a reputation as an authority on the Middle East, subsequently reinforced by her role in intelligence for the Arab Bureau during World War I and in the establishment of the British-dominated Iraqi state afterward.

One of her biographers states that “[n]o life could ever have been better documented than that of Gertrude Bell” (H. V. F. Winstone, *Gertrude Bell*, p. vii). This is certainly the case with respect to her Arabian journey. She kept not one, but two; diaries of her journey. One was a journal that recorded daily events and observations. The other was a more considered and self-reflective diary, written on alternating days, that related her experiences for the benefit of Major Charles Doughty–Wylie, the married army officer and diplomat (and nephew of Charles Doughty) with whom she had fallen in love. Both diaries appear in the volume under review, the Doughty-Wylie version as the main text, followed by the daily journal in a hundred-page appendix. They are accompanied by some of the remarkable photographs that Bell took during her trip.

Why did Gertrude Bell undertake this journey? Her motives are never made clear in the diaries. She engages in some half-hearted archeology and mapping, and the diaries' editor, Rosemary O'Brien, offers evidence that she was an unpaid informant for the Admiralty's Intelligence Division. Like certain other Europeans who ventured into this harsh and hazardous environment, however, Bell appears to have been drawn to the desert for the most part by personal psychic needs. Shortly after her departure from Damascus, she states that she “felt as if I had cast down all burdens” (p. 45), and several times she claims to be indifferent to her fate, leading O'Brien to suggest that she “sought danger as an aphrodisiac, possibly the expression of thwarted sexuality” (p. 10). The introspective nature of the diaries offers plenty of opportunities to engage in such psychoanalytic speculation.

The main audience for this publication doubtless will be readers with a biographical interest in Bell, but the diaries provide an intriguing glimpse into the broader forces that brought Arab peoples within the European imperial orbit in the early 20th century. Apart from her gender, Bell was typical of the sort of person—others included T. E. Lawrence, St. John Philby, and

W. H. I. Shakespear—who in effect scouted the Arabian hinterland on behalf of British imperial interests, surveying the scene for signs of the deterioration of Ottoman influence and the encroachments of European rivals. Bell's curiosity was unquenchable, encompassing geography, ethnography, archeology, history, politics, poetry, and more. Her fluency in Arabic and Persian gave her an uncommon degree of access to bedouin and urban Muslim societies. She notes after arriving in Baghdad in late March that she has not spoken English since leaving Damascus in December. Her wide network of friends and acquaintances provided her with vital intelligence about the areas she passed through: the daily journal is especially useful in revealing her talent for gathering information from those she meets. She was a shrewd political analyst who detected the early murmurings of an Arab nationalist movement, anticipated the triumph of the Saudis over the Rashids in Arabia, and noted the growing influence of the Germans in Baghdad. But her diary entries were also shot through with an Orientalist romanticism, referring time and again to the appeal of an "unadulterated East" that seemed "straight from the *Arabian Nights*" (p. 85).

And, of course, she was a woman, a fact that shaped her experiences and informed her perceptions in its own particular ways. Although she was a vocal opponent of the British feminist movement and did "not like the rule of women" (p. 89), her gender gave her entree to the intimate world of Arab women, which she recorded in her diary and her photographs with sympathetic frankness. No romanticism colored her view of harems, for example. Gender also affected her own identity as a traveler and explorer. She suffered occasional bouts of depression brought on by the conviction that her sex barred her from "something exciting, a raid, or a battle" that might validate her experience as a true adventure. "It's a bore being a woman when you are in Arabia" (p. 74).

Bell's diaries, then, touch on a wide array of issues—Orientalist knowledge, imperialist rivalries, the world of the bedouins, the role of women in Arab society, the constraints of gender on her own life, and so forth. O'Brien contributes an informative Introduction that summarizes Bell's life and sets her diaries in context; she also annotates the Doughty–Wylie diary (though not the daily journal) and supplies a helpful glossary and map. The photographs enrich the text and are useful historical documents in their own right. Syracuse University Press deserves praise for producing such a handsome volume. It is well worth the attention of anyone interested in Gertrude Bell and the European encounter with the Arab world in the early 20th century.

DEBORAH S. BERNSTEIN, *Constructing Boundaries: Jewish and Arab Workers in Mandatory Palestine*, Israel Studies Series (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000). Pp. 293. \$71.50 cloth, \$23.95 paper.

REVIEWED BY MARK LEVINE, Department of History, University of California, Irvine

Constructing Boundaries is the latest entry in a growing body of revisionist scholarship on the history and political economy of Palestine under the British, contesting the once cherished notion that the Jewish and Palestinian communities of Palestine/Israel were best investigated and understood as isolated and autonomously developing entities. By focusing on one urban setting—Haifa, which during the Mandate period became Palestine's most important port and industrial center—this work provides new insight into how the industrial economy of Palestine shaped, and in turn was shaped by, the conflictual interaction of the two communities.

The book begins with a discussion of the split-labor-market theory of Edna Bonacich and its application to the labor market in Mandatory Palestine. It then moves to an analysis of the particularities of Haifa: its general development and the development of the labor market in

construction, manufacturing, the Haifa port, and the Palestine railways. Throughout these chapters, Bernstein reads the development of the city and its various industries through the prism of the relations between Palestinian Arab and Jewish workers. Her findings illuminate, for example, the dual process of interpenetration and separation between the Jewish and Arab sectors in the construction trade while demonstrating how “the major trends within the Haifa labor scene were similar to those observable in Palestine as a whole—the predominance of separatism in the orientation of the Jewish community, the formation of a split labor market, and the intricate interplay between economic and national–political factors” (p. 80).

Even where the Jewish manufacturing industry was relatively independent in relation to the Arab economy, “it was by no means neutral” (p. 123). And thus even when “Jewish workers . . . were committed to the well-being of the Arab workers, the separation between them was structured into the conflict. For a time both Jewish and Arab workers did strike together, but it was a dubious case of ‘togetherness’” (p. 138). Such separatism (a tendency previously discussed by writers such as Gershon Shafir, Barbara Smith, and Zachary Lockman), augmented by the skills and capital imported by Jewish immigrants, was instrumental in securing a comparative advantage to Jewish industry vis-à-vis its Arab neighbors.

Bernstein’s research also reveals, perhaps counterintuitively, the relationship between prosperity and increasing competition between Arab and Jewish workers, whereas times of higher unemployment saw less intercommunal competition in many sectors. It was within these complicated and fluid dynamics that the difficulty of Zionist unions to ensure jobs for Jewish workers (in the Jewish as well as government sectors), coupled with nationalist sentiments and ideologies on both sides, created an atmosphere of suspicion and mistrust that made cases of joint action the exception rather than the rule.

In a key moment of the book, Bernstein recounts a strike of skilled Arab construction workers in 1932 to reduce the workday from twelve to eight hours. The Arab contractor fired the strikers, and when they went to the Jewish Haifa Labor Council for help, it proposed joint action with the Arab union (to which most of the Arab workers belonged), which like its Jewish counterpart “expressed support, but did little” because it was against joint action. As the British district commissioner was not about to push for an eight-hour day for Arab workers, “the Arab construction workers had little prospect of effective labor action” (p. 91), despite concerted and often courageous efforts by many workers. Such dynamics made it easier for the Zionist labor leaders to present Arab workers as non-actors, passive and without a presence of their own or interests to defend.

Thus, in settings propitious for interaction, physical proximity was hardly ever transformed into concrete forms of cooperation between the workers. Despite this fact, great pressures were sometimes exerted by the rank and file on Jewish and Palestinian union leaders to engage in joint action toward improving working conditions for both groups.

Indeed, in the manufacturing sector both Jewish and Arab workers “came up against specific difficulties, but these did not stem, primarily, from the challenge each posed to the other” (p. 109). That is, Jewish manufacturing workers relied on an industry that faced competition from cheap imported goods (as opposed to cheap Arab labor), and so their main rallying cry was “buy products of the land”—Jewish industry—and not the call of “*avoda ivrit*,” or Jewish labor. Yet how can we separate land, labor, and the competition between the two communities over these two resources?

In fact, Bernstein’s use of Bonacich marks a useful extension of Gershon Shafir’s utilization of the split–labor–market paradigm in his study of late Ottoman, predominantly rural relations in his seminal *Land, Labor and the Origins of the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict*. But her focus on the labor markets in Haifa, in isolation from the larger issues surrounding competition over land in the city and throughout Palestine, misses crucial linkages between urban and rural

settings, between land and labor, that profoundly shaped the political economy of Haifa, and of Palestine as a whole.

Thus, Bernstein quotes the Jewish Haifa Labor Council from 1934 summing up its “whole ideology concerning Eretz Yisrael in once sentence: ‘Hebrew labor!’” when already by 1909, as Shafir documents, the labor movement recognized control of land as well as (if not instead of) labor as the key arena for the struggle by Zionist Jews and Palestinian Arabs. Land and labor together constituted a potent brew that nourished the “militant exclusivist nationalism” (in Shafir’s words) that would eventually pervade even “Red Haifa.”

With such a perspective, Bernstein misses the spatial and discursive impact of the powerful slogans she presents to her readers, such as “Buy the Produce of the Land,” “As the people of Tel Aviv build on the sands, so we will build on the rocks. The slopes of the Carmel will be our fortress,” “We shall cover thee with a gown of concrete and cement” (words sung by the “urban pioneers” working in the Jewish cement works in Haifa), and the call by Arab Palestinians to by “*watani*,” or products of the Arab Palestinian homeland (pp. 40, 58, 83, 126). Such slogans, I argue, highlight the symbolic and practical importance of territory in the construction of the boundaries Bernstein forcefully describes.

In a similar manner, Bernstein is critical of Zachary Lockman’s pioneering and more broadly focused study of Arab–Jewish labor relations, *Comrades and Enemies*, particularly of his attention to “attitudes, perceptions and discourses” (p. 7), whose importance I would argue she undervalues. Where Lockman sought to use relational history to investigate systems of meaning that helped structure—and were inextricably bound up with—economic relations between Arabs and Jews, Bernstein, as her title would suggest, believes his analysis “ignores the separation” between the two groups. For her, the focus on discourse and meaning “tends to ‘release’ his actors from the full forces of the national, political, and economic context in which they interacted and impinged on each other” (p. 7).

It is hard to argue against the force of Bernstein’s context, or the constraining powers of the boundaries the Histadrut and other Jewish nationalist institutions erected, on attempts at Jewish–Palestinian labor solidarity. Yet if one compares each of their analyses of settings such as the Neshet Cement Works or the Palestine Railways, it is clear that Bernstein focuses on a set of events within each workplace that is different from that of Lockman: Bernstein’s events highlight the conflicts between them, while Lockman’s narrative reveals greater intensity of support by Jewish workers for their Arab “comrades.”

Neither portrayal is wrong, and indeed their juxtaposition attests to the complexity and richness of the Haifa labor markets as a source of social and political economies. And in the railways, which were the site of the densest and most complex web of personal relations between Jewish and Palestinian workers in the country, a similar conclusion is reached by both authors: the very impossibility of implementing Hebrew labor policies “*necessitated*” a strategy of class solidarity by the Jewish and Palestinian unions—even as each feared that cooperation would only strengthen the other (p. 186; italics in original). In a space where Jews and Arabs alike were “natives,” “Long live Arab–Jewish unity” was a slogan with teeth (p. 200). But by assuming that she is avoiding the messy tangle of discourses and attitudes—which a reading of her many lengthy quotations in this chapter would in fact seem to question—Bernstein also misses the sense of possibility among the workers during the last decade of British rule, which made Haifa a unique space of interaction between them and which clarifies the unprecedented episodes of intercommunal working-class militancy and cooperation during this period. Such a perspective renders the ostensibly predestined turn toward war in 1948, in which nationalist discourses permanently trumped class solidarity, that much more tragic.

Yet Bernstein’s goal in writing *Constructing Boundaries*, like her focus, is narrower than Lockman’s; thus, the ambivalence highlighted by Lockman helps us understand the ambivalence

of the larger Zionist labor movement as a nationalist-colonial-*cum*-socialist enterprise, and how it defined itself (often through a good deal of cognitive dissonance) through its imagination and representations of Arab workers. At the same time, Bernstein's focus on the more exclusionist results in the labor market reveals how that ambivalence was resolved on the ground.

With detailed tables and charts compiled through archival sources and discussions of Arab as well as Jewish industries in Haifa, Bernstein has done a great service for scholars working on the inter-war economy of Palestine. Arab workers "did not want to construct boundaries" (p. 207), she explains. The problem was that such boundaries were in the vested interest of the Jewish workers—or, at least, their leaders in the organized Zionist labor movement. Indeed, as she argues in her conclusion—rightly, I would say—fifty-odd years after the establishment of Israel as a Jewish state, the legacy of the Mandatory period must be considered in any pathology of why joint action and solidarity between the two communities remains illusive.

PALMIRA BRUMMETT, *Image and Imperialism in the Ottoman Revolutionary Press, 1908–1911* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000). Pp. 489. \$86.50 cloth, \$29.95 paper.

REVIEWED BY ELIZABETH THOMPSON, Department of History, University of Virginia, Charlottesville

The reader plunges into the whirlwind of revolution in this study of the satirical press that circulated after the Young Turks reinstated the Ottoman constitution in 1908. The brave new world depicted in the more than one hundred cartoons reprinted in this work is headed in unknown and often paradoxical directions: we see starving peasants confront fur-coated revolutionaries; dragon-headed despots leading Lady Liberty by the arm; cadaverous cholera victims patrolling the streets; and a woman steering an airplane above the revolutionary city of the future. The 1908 revolution will never look quite the same to readers familiar with the (still scant) treatment of the subject in the English language. Palmira Brummett addresses her innovative study not only to revisionist historians of the late Ottoman period, but also to a wider community of scholars interested in the history of publishing and the construction of identity in the Middle East, Europe, and elsewhere.

The importance of the satirical gazettes (*mizah mecmualari*) is suggested first by their apparent popularity. While just 103 Turkish-language gazettes were published between 1879 and 1907, years of palace censorship, 240 new gazettes were published in 1908–09, when press laws were relaxed in the revolution's first year. Brummett focuses on sixty-eight Turkish-language gazettes, all published in Istanbul between 1908 and 1911, that she terms "satirical." Satire, which had a long history before the revolution, clearly appealed to people inspired but also bewildered by revolutionary change: "[t]he Ottoman press . . . had a field day after the revolution, and nowhere were the critiques of revolution, of imperialism, and of culture more pointed than in the satirical gazettes" (p. 3). While the satirical gazettes were only one facet of the revolutionary press explosion, Brummett argues that they represent a distinct and heretofore unstudied voice, "a jaundiced eye, which saw in revolution not solely the ideal-induced euphoria of freedom but the reality-induced skepticism of imperialist innovation and bureaucratic paralysis" (p. 18). Moreover, they created, among their mainly male, elite readers, a "public" and a voice for that public (Chapters 3 and 4). In addition, Brummett argues, the cartoons in the gazettes probably reached audiences far beyond the literate elite, and so reflect broader popular sentiment. For these reasons, Brummett eschews a focus on the top newspapers of the period in favor of a focus on the seemingly marginal—but popular and populist—satirical gazette.

In addition to their market importance, the gazettes present a significant window on revolutionary thought and process, Brummett argues. Their cartoons became an arena in which Ottoman identity and sovereignty were constructed through the creation of, and competition among, revolutionary symbols (pp. 14, 317). Nuances of meaning that made contemporaries chuckle, however, are often lost over time. Brummett therefore cautions that hers must necessarily be a preliminary “archeological” study. In a series of chapters devoted to cartoon themes of sovereignty, European political and cultural influence, disease, fashion, street life, and technology, she sifts through layers of meaning that have faded over decades of cultural and political change. Each chapter seeks to retrieve the cartoons’ original meanings by reconstituting their textual and historical contexts.

Brummett’s foray into pictorial archeology yields some surprising finds. Expecting to find the secular–religious ideological cleavage that characterized the French revolutionary press (and that has dominated historians’ interpretation of the Young Turk revolution), Brummett finds none. Instead, Brummett discovers the dominant theme to be anxiety about European influence and invasion. This mind-set is comprehensible, Brummett argues, only if we understand the Ottoman Empire in a colonial context: “although the Ottoman state was not directly conquered and ‘colonized’ in the sense that India was colonized, its systems (education, communication, transport), economy, and culture had been colonized as surely as had those of India” (p. 13). Fear of European designs on the realm preserved Islam as a social cement, she argues, and diverted many satirists from engaging in internal disputes that might have weakened defenses. This was no reactionary Islam, however. Brummett challenges prevailing views that the 1908 revolution essentially polarized Islam against the West, or religion against progress. Satirists and their readers, she argues, occupied and preferred a middle ground, where Islam was seen not as a reactionary force but as a unifying force in a society under tremendous pressure from external invasion. Indeed, in their view Islam was not antithetical to modernity and technology; rather, it was essential to their future progress as a sovereign society. Satirical gazettes, she concludes, reflected a complex modernity and a prevailing sentiment of Ottoman solidarity against a common foreign threat (pp. 314–25).

The colonial premise informs Brummett’s thematic analysis of the cartoons in the book’s main chapters. On comic images of sovereignty, for example, Brummett argues that colonial anxiety profoundly altered perceived goals of the revolution. The threat of invasion “made many writers skeptical that a parliament could effectively replace the authority of the sultan” (p. 13). They thus defied a strict dichotomy between constitutionalism and sultanism. Some satirists portrayed monarchy as obsolete, as in a cartoon placing Sultan Abdulhamid in an “Outcasts’ Club,” bowling like a retiree with the Shah of Iran and the Moroccan king (pp. 118–19). Others portrayed the sultan as a collaborator with foreign imperialists or as bloody tyrant, his throne surrounded by the skulls of innocent citizens (p. 125). The parliamentary regime was hardly portrayed as a positive antidote, however, as images emphasized the ignorance, corruption, and greed of ministers and deputies (pp. 132–47). Underlying the disdain for unresponsive government was the fear that its weakness would let the European wolf in the door.

Another salient theme was the critique of European influences on popular culture, fashion, and urban public space (Chapters 7–10). Through their critique, Brummett found, the cartoons forged a popular notion of Ottoman identity that was quite distinct from the narrow Turkish nationalism that many scholars today say characterized the period. Satirists did not necessarily choose the old over the new but sought an Ottoman modernity based in some kind of continuity with the past that was independent of Europe. Patriotic women in practical, national dress (and not veiled) were offered as positive symbols of the nation (p. 243), whereas fads imported from Europe, such as spiritualism and ice-skating, were portrayed as ridiculous

pastimes of the rich (pp. 213–20). Women dressed in Parisian fashions became the most common symbol of the subversion of Ottoman culture. Several cartoons used such women to portray the invasion of deadly cholera into Istanbul's streets (pp. 273–87). Most of all, the cartoons simply marveled at the changes in Ottoman society, portraying sheer wonder at the simultaneous danger and promise of tramways, automobiles, and dirigibles. Many cartoons, for example, spoofed attempts to make "Oriental" culture run according to "Western" clocks: "[t]here was clearly ambivalence over whether the Ottoman empire should be run on European time and a European calendar just because it now had a European-style constitution" (p. 313).

The emphasis on a common culture and shared difference from Europe, Brummett argues, dominated the cartoons to the near-exclusion of cartoons focused on differences among Ottoman citizens. Brummett found few cartoons concerned with ethnic separatism, the conflict between nationalism and empire, or tensions between nationalism and religion that scholars have supposed to be dominant perspectives of the revolutionary period. Ethnicity, rather, was portrayed in cartoons to dramatize rural culture—the Anatolian peasant or Albanian villager—as opposed to the cosmopolitan Ottomanism of the city. Ethnicity was also reserved for foreigners: Moroccans and Egyptians were portrayed as distinctly Arab, while Syrians were not so differentiated from other Ottomans. Brummett suggests that this attitude may simply reflect the Ottomanist bias of gazette publishers rather than general opinion (pp. 321–23).

These findings resonate with some other recent reinterpretations of the period, especially Selim Deringil's view of Sultan Abdulhamid as a very modern monarch in *The Well Protected Domains* and Hasan Kayali's de-emphasis of Turkish nationalism in his *Arabs and Young Turks*. Brummett's general findings conflict, however, with studies that have focused on women and minorities in the late Ottoman period, groups seen as caught in the ideological vise of traditional–modern, Islamic–Western, and multicultural–nationalist dichotomies. This is a limitation perhaps inherent in Brummett's project to conduct an intensive analysis of a single subgenre of press publications. But while Brummett uses the cartoons to problematize received understandings of the Ottoman constitutional revolution, she does not pretend to offer a global rereading of it. Indeed, she emphasizes that hers is only one of many possible readings of the revolutionary mood (p. 23). It is left largely to the reader—and to those inspired to conduct further research—to decide how representative these satirists and their principally male, elite audience of Istanbul were of broader revolutionary trends.

This would seem to be a narrow goal for such a large book, were it not for Brummett's demonstrated commitment to unearthing, surveying, and deciphering a hitherto unexploited historical source. Research on the Middle Eastern press is in its infancy, and so the basic exposition of the journals and their contents is justified. Hence, Brummett stays close to her analysis of the cartoons, providing only enough historical background to explain them contextually. In this same spirit, she provides a full inventory of the sixty-eight gazettes examined, a price list, and a map of publishing houses in the appendix. (It would also have been helpful had Brummett provided citations with the cartoons' captions, rather than forcing the reader to search through endnotes.) In its effort to sketch the relationship between the press and the formation of political and cultural identities, Brummett's book joins recent studies such as those by Elizabeth Frierson on the late Ottoman press, by Beth Baron on the early Egyptian women's press, by Rashid Khalidi on early Arab nationalism in Syrian and Palestinian newspapers, by Walter Armbrust and Ami Ayalon generally on Arab journalism, and by various scholars of small media in the 1979 Iranian Revolution. With its foregrounding of the methodological dilemmas of deciphering images, the book makes a particularly significant contribution to recent studies of Middle Eastern cartoons in volumes published by, among others, Janet Afary on the Iranian constitutional revolution, Fatma Müge Göçek on political cartoons, and Allen Douglas and Fedwa Malti-Douglas on Arab comic strips.

TIM EPKENHANS, *Die iranische Moderne im Exil: Bibliographie der Zeitschrift Kaveh, Berlin 1916–1922*, Islamwissenschaftliche Quellen und Texte aus deutschen Bibliotheken (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz, 2000). Pp. 216.

REVIEWED BY KAMRAN ARJOMAND, Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Sachsen-Anhalt, Martin-Luther-Universität, Halle, Germany

Intellectual history of modernism in Iran has proved to be a subject of lively academic interest. The role of Iranian exiles in late 19th and early 20th century, in particular, has drawn considerable scholarly attention. In recent years, the Iranian press in exile has also become a focus of academic scrutiny. In Germany, Anja Pistor-Hatam has studied the Iranian intellectual community in Istanbul around the newspaper *Akhtar* (*Nachrichtenblatt, Informationsbörse und Diskussionsforum: Ahtar-e Estānbūl (1876–1896)—Anstöße zur frühen persischen Moderne* [Münster, 1999]) and Keivandokht Ghahari's doctoral dissertation is concerned with ideas of nationalism and modernism among Iranian intellectuals in Berlin as reflected in the journals *Kāveh*, *Iranshahr*, and *Ayandeh* (*Nationalismus und Modernismus in Iran in der Periode zwischen dem Zerfall der Qāğāren-Dynastie und der Machtfestigung Reżā Schah* [Berlin, 2001]). In this context, the bibliography of *Kāveh* is thus a welcomed contribution.

This monograph is a thoroughly revised and extended version of the author's master's thesis. It contains two distinct parts. The first part, Chapters 1–4 (pp. 12–104), deals with the historical background to the formation of Berlin's Persian Committee (das Persische Comité) in 1915 and the subsequent publication of *Kāveh* (1916–22). The second part, Chapters 5–6 (pp. 105–210), is the bibliography.

A short and useful introduction on the subject provides a brief discussion of previous publications on *Kāveh*. The author then presents an account of historical backgrounds leading to the formation of the Persian Committee. This task is carried out by considering important German Foreign Ministry documents anew. Epkenhans points out that the Iranian community in Berlin—encompassing those who were directly connected with *Kāveh*—was formed as a result of World War I and in accordance with the German *Persienpolitik* (Persian policy) between 1872 and 1922. The author argues that the German strategy toward the Muslim population of the world in World War I was delineated by Max von Oppenheim, who directed the *Nachrichtenstelle für den Orient* (Orient Information Bureau). Max von Oppenheim was recalled to the German Foreign Ministry in August 1914 to work on Islamic affairs. His doctrine amounted to “revolutionizing Islamic regions under enemy control” in the Middle East and India. This was to be achieved by unleashing a massive propaganda campaign aimed at mobilizing Muslims under the banner of jihad. However, the author maintains that, thanks to the marginal role of Iran during World War I, the *Persienpolitik* was not determined by the *Orientpolitik* but, rather, was based mainly on “the personal enthusiasm and engagement” of those working in the Orient Information Bureau and officers and diplomats operating in Iran (p. 19). This statement is, nevertheless, qualified by maintaining that it was only after the failure of the jihad doctrine (1914–16) that the Orient Information Bureau of the German Foreign Ministry considered supporting the line of nationalism as a promising alternative strategy in Iran, implying that the Oppenheim Doctrine was followed with respect to Iran until then. In this context, Epkenhans maintains that the naming of the journal *Kāveh* in 1915, chosen from the Persian mythology contained in Ferdowsi's *Shahnama*, need not necessarily be understood as being out of line with the Islamic bias of the German *Orientpolitik* (p. 33). Prima facie, these two claims seem contradictory.

Despite his extensive consultation of German official documents, the author's arguments are inconclusive. Epkenhans does not give a satisfactory answer to the central question of how the German Foreign Ministry actually shaped its so-called *Persienpolitik*, which supported the Per-

sian Committee and its involvement in tribal insurrections within Iran. Nor does he demonstrate how the *Persienpolitik* deviated from the *Orientpolitik* delineated by von Oppenheim. These questions and the clarification of the intricacies in German–Iranian relations in this period, however, fall outside the scope of present study, which aims to throw light on the Iranian community in Berlin and the journal *Kāvih*. Two short biographies of Taqizadeh and Jamalzadeh, based mainly on Persian sources, are also provided in the book. Chapter 3 covers the organizational and financial aspects of *Kāvih*, such as its printing house, Chapkhaneh-ye Kaviyani; censorship and control of its content by the German Foreign Ministry; and, finally, its reception by Iranians. This chapter brings interesting facts to light by demonstrating the extent of German pressure on the editors and showing that *Kāveh* was a politically unsuccessful enterprise in its first period of publication (1916–19).

In Chapter 4, the author talks about the form and content of journalistic expression in *Kāveh*, focusing on its war propaganda and politics as well as its post-war program of modernization.

The second part of the book consists of the bibliography of *Kāveh*. Divided into primary and secondary sources, the author provides a very good bibliography not only on *Kāveh* and the Iranian intellectuals in Berlin, but also on the history of German involvement in Iran and events in Iran around World War I.

The headlines of articles in *Kāvih* in Persian and German are chronologically tabulated, and information on the contents of some of these articles is also given. In addition, proper names and keywords that occur in or relate to the contents of these articles are indexed. This concordance to *Kāvih* may provide a very useful research tool. However, there is a handicap: the entries are a mixture of German and Persian words and phrases, which could make the search cumbersome—for example, *siyāsatčī* (professional politician) but *rote Sonne* (red sun), not *Khushīd-i surkh*, is the title of an article. Unfortunately, there are too few cross-references that could have compensated for this deficiency.

In all, this book is a useful historical introduction and a valuable bibliographical aid to scholars of Iranian modernity.

WILLIAM HALE, *Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774–2000* (Newbury Park, U.K., and Portland, Ore.: Frank Cass, 2001). Pp. 375. \$49.50 cloth.

REVIEWED BY TOZUN BAHCHELI, Department of Political Science, King's College, London, Ont.

Even before the publication of this book, William Hale enjoyed a reputation as a well-informed and productive scholar of Turkish politics. He has greatly enhanced his place in Turkish studies with the publication of this outstanding book on Turkish foreign policy.

Hale states two primary objectives for this work: first, to study the evolution of Turkish foreign relations since the late 18th century, with particular attention to the period since World War II. The author's second goal (expressed more as a hope) is that his study might offer insights to the way medium-size states "have acted in the changing international environments of the past 200 years" (p. 1). It is arguable whether the author has provided enough comparative material to shed light on middle-power behavior. This, after all, is essentially a case study of Turkish foreign policy. Nevertheless, the author deserves great credit for achieving his primary objective. He has written a comprehensive and thoroughly researched narrative of Turkish foreign policy.

How does a "middle power" confronted by multiple foes safeguard its security? This was a challenge faced by the Ottoman Empire during much of its later existence, coping with threats from rebelling subject peoples and numerous external adversaries. The author's survey of Otto-

man foreign relations from the late 18th century up to the end of World War I (the subject of the first chapter and half of the second chapter) illustrates how the Ottoman state fashioned defensive strategies, usually by aligning itself with major powers. Skillful Ottoman diplomacy slowed the empire's decline without, however, preventing its eventual collapse.

With a more defensible territory and relatively homogeneous population, Turkey—led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk—faced better odds than the Ottoman state and it succeeded in protecting its security. With the onset of World War II (and later the Cold War), however, Turkey was forced to confront its vulnerabilities as a middle power. Given the fear that Hitler or Stalin might invade Turkey, Turkish leaders endeavored to keep their country out of World War II. After the war, however, the fear of the Soviet threat against Turkey's territory and independent statehood was so great that Turkish leaders were keen to become engaged on the side of the Western allies against the Soviet Union. Turkey's membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, realized in 1951, was an important turning point in its recent history.

Having traced Turkey's diplomatic experience during World War II and the early years of the Cold War, the author examines the effects of the changing international and regional environment on Turkish foreign policy. Ankara's perception of a diminution of the Soviet threat, and its frustrations over what it viewed as insufficient Allied support for the Turkish cause in Cyprus (following the onset of civil strife on the island in 1963), encouraged Turkish leaders to consider more independent policies. Nevertheless, the bipolar order limited the scope for autonomous Turkish policies.

The end of the Cold War order and the collapse of the Soviet Union created new strategic options for Turkish leaders. At the same time, though, the new international order and its effects on Turkey's region created numerous risks. Hale devotes no less than two-fifths of his book to examining the effects on Turkey of the profound changes in the international environment with the end of the Cold War. The result is a detailed study of Turkey's post-Cold War relations with the West and with all the countries in its vicinity—namely, Greece, Cyprus, and the countries of the Balkans and Transcaucasia, the Middle East, and Central Asia. In addition, Hale has provided a separate and useful chapter (Chapter 6) examining the relationship between foreign-policy issues and the domestic environment. Here the author briefly discusses the role played by "state actors" (the president, prime minister, military leaders, foreign ministers, and Foreign Ministry staff), political parties, and public opinion in foreign-policy-making. He concludes the chapter with five pages of the economic issues and how they relate to Turkey's foreign relations.

The author then uses his final chapter to tie all the previous material together, commenting on historical continuities and reorientations in Turkish foreign policy; the effects of domestic political changes and contending ideas of the identity of the state; its conduct of foreign policy; and future directions for Turkey's external relations. Hale generally assigns a high grade to Turkish diplomacy, noting, for example, Ankara's influencing of Western policy in northern Iraq and during the Bosnian war. The author also argues that the advantages to Turkey of the new Turkish-Israeli strategic partnership appear to outweigh the risks arising from Arab and Iranian opposition to such a relationship.

In praise of Turkey, Hale contends that "(with the arguable exception of Cyprus) realism and pragmatism was the dominant theme in Turkish policy in the post-Cold War era, as it had been throughout most of Turkish diplomacy since the late eighteenth century" (p. 330). However, he stresses critical areas of uncertainty in Turkey's future relations with the United States and in its pursuit of full membership within the European Union. Similarly, he surveys Turkey's post-Cold War regional relationships, explaining how Turkish interests can be jeopardized by events beyond its control.

As comprehensive as this work is, it has some weaknesses. While enumerating Turkey's disputes with Greece in the Aegean, Hale is surprisingly brief in his discussion of the territorial

sea, the continental shelf, and—especially—the issue of airspace. Similarly, he devotes no more than three pages to discussing Turkey's post-Cold War foreign-policy-making and the role of "actors," parties, and public opinion. These shortcomings aside, Hale's work is a meticulously researched and lucidly written book with an impressive bibliography and useful maps. Students and scholars of Turkish foreign policy will be well served by this book for years to come.

JOSEPH HELLER, *The Birth of Israel, 1945–1949: Ben-Gurion and His Critics* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2000). Pp. 379. \$49.95.

REVIEWED BY BERNARD REICH, Department of Political Science, George Washington University, Washington, D.C.

Joseph Heller, associate professor of international relations at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem who has previously written about the transition from the Palestine Mandate to Israel (including a study of the Stern Gang and of Zionist politics in the pre-state period), examines a period of great interest to students of contemporary Middle Eastern history and politics, as well as to those who focus on Zionism, Israel, and the Arab–Israeli conflict. He analyzes the internal decision-making of the Zionist Yishuv (Jewish community in Palestine) leadership in Jerusalem from the end of World War II until the armistice agreements at the termination of the first Arab–Israeli War (the Israeli War of Independence; al-Nakba for the Arabs)—in other words, the events leading to and immediately following the creation of the State of Israel.

The end of World War II marked the beginning of a crucial and complex period in the contemporary Middle East in which the current configuration of the region developed. In no sector was this more important than in what was then the Palestine Mandate. The aftermath of the war (especially the British inability to retain its empire) and the impact of the Holocaust (particularly its practical effects on the Middle East) created conditions that led to the end of the Mandate and to the independence of Israel, as well as to the ensuing Arab–Israeli conflict. This period has been widely and carefully analyzed—and, by some, misinterpreted. This volume is an interesting study that helps to complete a portion of the picture, but it does not give us all of the story.

The author contends that this is the "first comprehensive book on the internal decision-making of the Zionist leadership in Jerusalem in the crucial period of 1945–49" (preface). His thesis is that the Yishuv was at the center of the Zionist decision-making in this critical time; while other Zionist entities played at most an ancillary role, and within the Yishuv it was David Ben-Gurion who was the main and crucial figure. And, he contends, the Yishuv exploited well the available diplomatic "windows of opportunity." His main conclusion, and the basis for the scope of his study, is his assertion that "[t]he Jewish state came into being as a result of the Yishuv's accumulation of power and its exploitation of diplomatic windows of opportunity between 1945 and 1949" (p. ix). Primarily, it seeks to explore how Ben-Gurion, the head of the left-of-center Masai Party (the forerunner of the Labor Party), maintained his leadership in the Yishuv while he maneuvered for the partition plan.

"The leadership of David Ben-Gurion is the key to understanding how Zionism triumphed during the period 1936–49, and from 1945 to 1949 in particular" (p. 282). Ben-Gurion is credited with understanding what was needed for Zionist successes, including immigration, "international sympathy, military preparedness, a solid economic infrastructure, and acquisition of land" (p. 282). He is also seen as a man of compromise, apparently understanding that partition was the pragmatic concession and all of "the Land of Israel" could not be attained.

He comprehended the linkage of diplomacy and military capability. Clearly, Ben-Gurion was successful in both tasks and achieved the independence of Israel. Heller demonstrates this well, but the study would have benefited from greater use of the works of Ben-Gurion's biographers and others, such as Michael Bar-Zohar and Shabtai Teveth, who have closely examined his contributions to Israel's history and politics. While others have written about these themes, Heller asserts that he is the first to concentrate on the internal debate within the Yishuv and its Zionist parties over "means and ends." He argues that Ben-Gurion first had to unify the Yishuv, then had to convince the great powers to partition Palestine. And he believes that much of the success of the Zionist leadership was a result of Ben-Gurion's actions. This process is closely examined, and the author provides convincing evidence for his case. Nevertheless, his brief discussion of the relationship of the Yishuv with the United States and the Soviet Union and his examination of the superpowers' roles contributes little that is new.

In his analysis and examination of the policies and methods pursued by the Yishuv leadership in its efforts to achieve a Zionist solution in Palestine, Heller focuses on various political groups but omits those without a Zionist perspective. Unfortunately, this limits the comprehensiveness of the work—the author notes that he is "not concerned with non-Zionist parties" such as the ultra-Orthodox Agudat Israel and the Communist Party, both elements in the Yishuv, but not in the Zionist leadership. But they played (and continue to play) interesting, and sometimes important, roles in Israel's political life. He also excludes the Zionist leadership and parties in the Diaspora—a curious decision that also reduces our understanding of the content and the context of the Zionist decision-making. This is especially unfortunate given the continuing significance and debate over the relationship between Israel and the Diaspora that began then and that is reflected in various ways in Israeli politics, not the least of which is in the institution of the presidency that evolved from the rivalry between Ben-Gurion and Chaim Weizmann.

Despite some overlap with other works, especially given the very substantial literature that exists on Israel in its formative years, this study does make an original contribution, albeit self-limited, in its discussion of the internal Yishuv process. Although not the final word, it provides a useful and detailed first look at some of the material. The "notes" demonstrate substantial scholarship, citing a wide range of new and old sources, as is also suggested by the analysis in the main text. The author relies heavily on primary sources taken from a wide range of archives, most significantly those of the Central Zionist Archives.

The structure of the work facilitates its use. A brief chronology of basic events is presented at the outset, which helps to place the issues in perspective and allows the reader to track the narrative of the argument with ease. The bibliography is substantial in both range and content. An index is included.

The main text is supplemented by an appendix dealing with the debate on the "New Historians" (the so-called revisionist historians) and their work on the establishment of the State of Israel. Israelis like to discuss and debate almost everything, and "history"—especially their own—is among those themes on which alternative interpretations abound. The salient "facts" remain essentially in agreement; their presentation and interpretation vary. Heller is not content to let his work be accepted on its merits. He introduces a chapter "taking on" some of the others. This is a brief, unnecessary, and not especially enlightening effort.

In his chapter on the "new historians," the author enters the fray with definite and specific opinions, mostly critical of their works and how they have not well used the materials available, partly because of their existing bias toward the materials and the subject. His main argument is that three "revisionist historians" (Benny Morris, Avi Shlaim, and Ilan Pappé) have emphasized the 1948 war as a point of departure but should have begun their work with 1945. He also argues that their focus is too narrow and should have included the full Zionist-policy

perspective. He criticizes their critique of Israeli conduct and policy toward the Arabs. Basically, Heller believes in Ben-Gurion's pragmatism as the key to the Zionist success.

This is a book worth reading by students of the "new history" but primarily by political scientists and historians examining the period that led to the creation of the State of Israel seeking to understand and assess the elements in political decision-making during that crucial time. Whether one agrees with his perspective or not, Heller is to be commended for providing a readable and useful examination of a crucial period of the history of the politics of the contemporary Middle East, and in this case especially, Israel. Although the reader may find minor points with which to quibble, and may raise objections to the coverage or even the interpretations of events and information, this is a useful work to be read, in conjunction with other studies, to help fill out the picture of the process that led to the creation of the modern State of Israel. This is especially true in the case of Ben-Gurion, who has been treated extensively, and well, by numerous other works. This work contributes to our understanding of that complex figure, who was instrumental in creating and then managing the Jewish State.

MOHAMMAD GHOLI MAJD, *Resistance to the Shah: Landowners and the Ulama in Iran* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2000). Pp. 426. \$49.95 cloth.

REVIEWED BY AFSHIN MARASHI, Department of History, University of California, Los Angeles

If the history of the Middle East in the 20th century is a history of fundamental social changes and dislocations, then surely one important part of that story is the transformation that took place in the agrarian sector of many Middle Eastern societies. The politics of landownership and the projects of land reform in the 20th century were indeed among the most ambitious of the statist projects undertaken during what we can now look back on as the "age of modernization." Like so many large-scale projects of social engineering, land reform in the Middle East captured the optimism and idealism of modernization while producing some of its most brutal and unforeseen consequences.

Mohammad Gholi Majd's *Resistance to the Shah: Landowners and Ulama in Iran* is an important new work that looks carefully and critically at some of the consequences—social, economic, political, and cultural—of land policy in Iran during the Pahlavi period. Land policy in modern Iran has been the subject of numerous studies as far back as the seminal work of Anne Lambton in the 1950s and 1960s, as well as the work of Asghar Schirazi, Ervand Abrahamian, Nikki Keddie, Afsaneh Najmabadi, Eric Hoogland, and others. Majd's work is perhaps unique, however, in bringing the discussion of land policy in 20th-century Iran out of strict adherence to economic and political explanations to the personal costs incurred by participants in these reforms. What we are presented with is a work that, for the first time, tells the story of land reform through a combination of the detailed and often revisionist empirical observations of a trained economist with the sensitive and sympathetic renderings of a cultural historian.

Majd's central thesis is that land policy in Iran was guided by a premise that was fundamentally flawed. Contrary to the views of foreign observers and mid-20th-century Iranian policy-makers, landownership in Iran was not concentrated in the hands of a small number of large landowners. Although some large-scale landownership did exist throughout Iran, the much more important and pervasive pattern of landownership that Majd emphasizes is the large and dynamic sector of small and medium-size landowners in Iran. This important group of middle-class landowners—which included a broad swath of Iran's social strata, such as newly urbanized professionals, bazaaris, petty merchants, mid-level bureaucrats, rent collecting widows, and others—is crucial to understanding the nature of Iran's social system at mid-century. Ac-

ording to statistics Majd presents from 1960 census figures, of the 2.1 million landowners in Iran, at least half were members of this landowning middle class (p. 347). As Majd argues, this group was hardly the class of feudal ogres that it was made out to be by Iranian land-policy advocates. Further, landownership among the small and medium-size owners did not remain stagnant but was constantly in flux, producing a dynamism in the agrarian sector that had historically produced informal social relations leading to, among other things, investments in the famous *qanat* system of irrigation, one of the great achievements of traditional social relations in Iran's agrarian sector. Clearly, as Majd argues, Iranian land reformers and their American policy advisers were operating on the basis of a concept of "feudalism," which was ill-suited to Iran's agrarian sector—a one-size-fits-all concept of "feudalism" that, more than just incidentally, was the common vice of both Marxists and liberal "modernization theory" advocates.

Majd's book is in this sense another work in a burgeoning post-revolutionary Iranian historiography that is replete with latter-day Tocquevilles who thoughtfully ruminate on the failures of the ancien regime. Majd bears the Tocquevillian mantle well as he weighs in on the twists and turns of land reform in the Pahlavi period, all the while putting together the pieces of the puzzle that would lead to the revolution. *Resistance to the Shah* is, however, much more than another work purporting to explain the Iranian Revolution. Perhaps the most important achievement of Majd's book is in the richly detailed cast of characters that Majd presents as he tells the story of land politics. We are introduced, for example, to Mohammad Ali Majd (1891–1978), a leading landowner from Gilan and the founder of the Agricultural Union of Iran, the important organization established in 1959 to represent the interests of landowners during the years of land reform. Mohammad Ali Majd is also Mohammad Gholi Majd's father; the author relies extensively on his late father's memoirs to tell the story of land reform. It would be easy to quibble with the use of so personal a source in the production of a work of historiography; perhaps the use of his father's memoirs blurs the line between memory and history and undermines the claims of "detached" historiographic objectivity. Majd's use of his father's memoirs does indeed blur the line between memory and history, but it does so creatively and in a way that sheds light on the history of land reform. The extended excerpts from the memoirs not only flout the literary conventions of traditional historiography. They also undermine, subvert, and challenge them. The voice of Mohammad Ali Majd, the father, thus enters into the narrative of *Resistance to the Shah* like the chorus of a Greek tragedy, or like the booming voice of Hamlet's dead father bellowing forth from stage left. It is in this way that Majd captures the human story of land reform in 20th-century Iran in a way that is unlike any previous work on the subject. In describing his relationship with Ali Amini, the Liberal Party prime minister in 1962 who was responsible for land reform during its critical early stage, Majd quotes from his father's memoirs: "I never expected that Ali Amini, a son of Fakhre ad Dowleh, and a grandson of Mirza Ali Khan Amin ad Dowleh, would so willingly serve and carry out the orders of the American and British governments. . . . [H]is own brothers and sister . . . own the estates of Lashte Nesha in Gilan, one of the best properties in Iran" (pp. 125–26). Excerpts like this one pepper Majd's narrative. In the process, we come to understand the politics of land reform in 20th-century Iran, not only in terms of abstract sociological categories, but also in terms of the human drama of those who lived through these transformations. From the perspective of Majd the elder, therefore, the invisible hand of the British and the Americans was behind the policy of land reform; Ali Amini in turn was perceived as a "traitor to his class," and so forth.

We are also introduced to others, such as Thomas J. Scotese, a mid-level administrator at the American embassy in Iran. In February 1960, Scotese wrote a confidential report sent to the U.S. State Department in Washington, D.C., criticizing the land-reform policy then under consideration by the Shah. As Majd describes, the Scotese report was damning and prescient, observing that "[m]any of these persons [being displaced by land reform] are not necessarily large

or feudalistic landowners, but rather represent the very sinews of the upper and upper middle class from which the Shah derives much of his support.” Scotese goes on to warn of a creeping alliance between those displaced by the land policy and the ulama. As Majd explains, the “Scotese report” met a fate similar to that of other such reports written by well-meaning mid-level State Department bureaucrats: it went unread, gathering dust on the shelf of the State Department until Majd discovered and incorporated it into the narrative of his story. Majd also produces the original fatwa of Ayatollah Khomeini denouncing the policy of land reform. The discovery of this document is perhaps the most important piece of evidence produced in the book. Although Khomeini has long been suspected of being an opponent of the land-reform policies of the early 1960s, evidence supporting this claim, as Majd explains, has been scarce. Majd presents here both a facsimile and a translation of this document in which Khomeini denounces the confiscation of land under the guise of land reform, making the audacious claim that “no prayer on property confiscated in such a manner is valid.”

Majd’s book is filled with such colorful details and well-chosen vignettes. What we are presented with is a story that not only proposes a revisionist analysis of land reform using the categories of economics and political science, but also the human drama behind the reforms that has until now remained concealed. *Resistance to the Shah* will thus be of interest not only to specialists of agricultural economics and social history, but also to those who are interested in historicizing a past that today is moving beyond our memory.

USSAMA MAKDISI, *The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, History, and Violence in Ottoman Lebanon* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000). Pp. 259. \$22.00.

REVIEWED BY NAJWA AL-QATTAN, Department of History, Loyola Marymount University, Los Angeles

In *The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, History, and Violence in Ottoman Lebanon*, Usama Makdisi focuses on sectarianism as the defining experience in modern Mount Lebanon—indeed, as the core of Lebanese modernity itself. This work is a meticulous deconstruction of sectarianism as a discourse spawned by a particular historic conjecture—Ottoman reform in the age of European domination—in and around the tiny peripheral society of 19th-century Mount Lebanon. It is also an impassioned insistence not only on the historic but also the moral urgency of recognizing the contingency of, and the human agency in, the emergence of sectarianism and an invitation for hope in a Lebanese future that might yet dare to embrace an alternative modernity. Makdisi’s book is not only illuminated by the scholar’s insight; it is also animated by empathy for his subject matter and a talent that brings local society and its mountainous vistas vividly to the mind’s eye.

The book presents a tight and multi-layered argument in which sectarianism’s modern birthing is clocked around historic moments, each of them as dramatic as contingent. It is also a narrative that plots 19th-century sectarianism neither as Machiavellian European invention (and intervention) nor as primordial beast abruptly awakened. This is not to say that sectarianism was failed or corrupt nationalism. According to Makdisi, sectarianism was a radically new 19th-century political imagination, another offspring of modernity and just as modern, self-referential, and contingent as nationalism. Guided by the assumption that sectarianism was (is) both a discourse and a practice, Makdisi’s examination of a wide range of sources constructs a world inhabited and contested by European missionaries and consuls, Ottoman imperial and provincial officials, Maronite patriarchs and Druze shaykhs, and the *ahali* (commoners) who come to life here as tragic actors in a history of their own making.

The book is divided into eight chapters and an Epilogue. In Chapter 2, “The Gentle Crusade,” and Chapter 3, “Knowledge and Ignorance,” Makdisi contrasts the Mount Lebanon of European imagination—a biblical sanctuary and the object of a “gentle crusade” to save its “tribal” peoples from their Muslim surroundings—with local understandings of the mountain as a “multireligious society” that was “genealogically” mapped and hierarchically organized. Nineteenth-century Mount Lebanon was a rural outpost on the margins of imperial control, a place where notables controlled land, knowledge, violence, and the *ahali*. Makdisi’s analysis of local arrangements of power—incomplete in its somewhat careless dealing with the millet system and in its apparent conflation of state–society with center–province—evokes a world in which the notables were the local interpreters and practitioners of imperial control, where religious differences were superseded by the difference between knowledge and ignorance, and where the *ahali* were denied the possibility of historical interpretation and practice.

Until, that is, Ibrahim Pasha invaded Syria in 1831 and, in his wake, ushered in the arrival of modernity. In Chapter 4, “The Faces of Reform,” Makdisi offers an analytic narrative that diminishes (or, rather, reinterprets) the Egyptian role in modernizing Mount Lebanon and reads modernity in the emergence of a new political imagination that Ibrahim had merely made possible. Following Egyptian rule, which had loosened the ties that held the old regime together, the mountain was plunged into the intertwined politics of the Ottoman Tanzimat and the Eastern Question. This period, which had marked everywhere in the empire a turning point in politics, did so in Mount Lebanon, as well. There, a very local reading of and acting on European and imperial discourses—which differently focused religion as the site of reform—produced the sectarian–modern. For Makdisi, the emergence of sectarianism was a process that first unraveled itself in the explosion of Druze–Maronite violence in 1841 and culminated with the reconstitution of Mount Lebanon “geographically, politically, and culturally” by 1860.

In Chapter 5, “Reinventing Mount Lebanon,” Makdisi unravels European, Ottoman, and elitist participation in the geographical and communal reinvention of the mountain. Following the violence of 1841, those groups struggled about the meaning of tradition at the same time as they agreed on restoring it. This was a complex as well as a contingent process. In Mount Lebanon, where for the Europeans the very “course of modernity” was at stake, and where imperial power, identity, and progress were being tested, local elites responded to the historic possibilities thus opened up by taking hold of sectarian identity as their ticket into modernity. This “transformation of religious communities into political communities” involved the administrative redrawing of Mount Lebanon along sectarian boundaries in 1841 and the emergence of a new elite culture that celebrated “segregated communities” even as it struggled to maintain the social hierarchy. In other words, it was predicated on the denial of history, demography, and social reality and thus was fraught with contradictions and possibilities.

Makdisi next focuses his attention on how the struggle over the politics of reform reshuffled the relationship among religion, knowledge, and power so that “the door was unwittingly left open for the uncontrolled entrance of the *ahali* onto the sectarian stage” In Chapter 6, “The Return of the *Juhhal*,” Makdisi takes up the “momentous” arrival of the *ahali* on the stage of history and their elaboration of a modern identity—sectarianism, which nevertheless remained incomplete. He argues that Shahin’s 1858–59 movement in Kisrawan mobilized the *ahali* to change their social world but mobilized them as sectarian subjects. As such, it became catastrophic when the rebellion spread into the mixed areas where Maronite *ahali* were ruled by Druze overlords.

In Chapter 7, “The Devil’s Work,” Makdisi analyzes the sectarian bloodbath of the early summer of 1860 and argues that, fueled by new hatreds and new fears, the violence transgressed social, geographic, and religious boundaries and redefined the social order, albeit in an incom-

plete manner. Ultimately, the elites succeeded in controlling the violence and restoring order. But until they did, the violence of 1860 “was the one instant when the pure communal actor emerged untethered and unrestrained by any hierarchy” .

The Mutasarrifiyya marked an imperial–elitist restoration that banished the *ahali* from history. Chapter 8, “A Very Old Thing,” argues that, in its struggle to earn the badge of modernity, the Ottoman Empire imposed its socially conservative reading of the Tanzimat and responded to the *ahali* challenge with a disciplining violence against the elites whom it held responsible for igniting in the *ahali* that “very old thing” of sectarian hatred. It legitimized the terror it unleashed as civilized, ordered, just, and modern. Interestingly, Makdisi goes a long way to exonerate the Ottomans from responsibility in perpetrating the sectarian bloodbath, only to castigate them for perpetrating a different but equally bloody violence on peripheral society: the disciplining of the Druze elites. By the time the dust had settled, however, sectarian identity rather than the sectarian subject had become politically enshrined in Mount Lebanon. This politics stamped the Mutasarrifiyya—where Europeans and Ottomans charted the mountain’s route to modernity, and where new and disciplined sectarian elites became the agents of reform and centralization, thus casting sectarian political identity as reformist and modern. It was those elites who sat down in the late 19th century to write sectarian histories from which the *ahali* were erased.

Makdisi’s book fills a gap of immense importance in the study of sectarianism and the age of late empire, and it does so with breathtaking insight and in an impassioned authorial voice. It also raises a number of intellectually and morally provocative questions concerning religion, identity, and history.

Makdisi argues that the development of sectarianism instantiated a remarkable change in the meaning of religion in the construction of identity. His argument rests in part on the claim that in pre-Tanzimat Ottoman (and Egyptian) Mount Lebanon, where politics was imperially manufactured and genealogically practiced, religious difference was not a primary marker of power, and its highlighting in political discourse was a “tactical device.” Yet Makdisi’s claim that, when Ottoman imperial authority voiced itself in Islamic “metaphors,” it did so in order to “reinforce an allegedly inviolable social hierarchy” also suggests a certain primacy to religious distinctions. It is, therefore, noteworthy that religious distinctions lent themselves with “natural” ease to discourses on power and that the “naturalized” order inscribed disobedience as religious transgression.

Lest the desire to historicize sectarianism should also lead to the undermining of the role of religion in the old political order—especially post-Orientalism—I wish to add a note of caution from the other side concerning the too clean distinction that Makdisi draws between sectarianism and nationalism. He rightly argues that to view sectarianism as failed or corrupted nationalism is to partake in nationalism’s own discourse on sectarianism. This notwithstanding, it still remains unclear how sectarianism is different from nationalism, particularly in light of the author’s own assertion that it was the limits and contradictions inherent in the sectarian project that led to its ultimate failure to create pure confessional communities. Yet it seems to me that the nation-state is nothing but the successful negotiation of equally continent, similarly stratified, and no less imagined communities. Although Makdisi does not present it as such, there is here a striking resemblance between nationalizing elites in the age of European imperialism and the “sectarianizing” elites of Mount Lebanon. Both were fully embroiled in the colonial project in the age of the Tanzimat, both constructed communities that were at once primordial and stratified, and both found themselves confronting and ultimately silencing subaltern understandings of modernity. Hence, if Makdisi appears at times to be in sympathy with the sectarian actor, it is because he sees his actions neither as the raw bloodletting of primordial fears nor as the mechanical butchering of conspiracies, but as the momentous, albeit tragic and brief, expression of subaltern agency.

LAILA PARSONS, *The Druze Between Palestine and Israel, 1947–49*, St Antony's Series (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000). Pp. 197. \$65.00 cloth.

REVIEWED BY ANTHONY B. TOTH, St. Antony's College, Oxford University

Laila Parsons situates her study alongside those of the so-called new historians of the Arab–Israeli conflict who in recent years have rewritten large parts of the dominant narratives of the “traditionalist” historians. One of elements of these narratives has been the assumption that the struggle between Arabs and Jews was a starkly bipolar affair, with a relatively small number of Jews in conflict with a much larger, monolithic population of Arabs. Recent “revisionist” works, however, have shown that this interpretation is inaccurate. For example, an integral part of Zionist policy was to make contact with various Arab leaders and groups before, during, and after the emergence of the State of Israel and forge relationships that could advance the movement's geopolitical agenda. Scholars who have worked on this question include Avi Shlaim (*Collusion across the Jordan: King Abdullah, the Zionist Movement, and the Partition of Palestine*) and Kirsten Schulze (*Israel's Covert Diplomacy in Lebanon*). In *The Druze Between Palestine and Israel*, a compact and narrowly focused study based on the author's doctoral thesis, Parsons skillfully employs archival sources in Israel, as well as published accounts in English, Arabic, and Hebrew, to show how Zionist officials developed relationships with Druze leaders and representatives and how these links could benefit both sides.

The book is organized chronologically, with the short Introduction whisking the reader from the beginning of Druze history (during the reign of the Fatimid Caliph al-Hakim bi-Amr Allah, 996–1021) to the end of the Ottoman era. This section also provides a summary of the tenets of the Druze religion and an overview of Druze society and culture.

The first chapter is based mainly on secondary sources and shows how relations between the Jews and the Druze in Palestine developed during the British Mandate (1917–47). Parsons notes, for example, that Jewish Agency officials began making overtures to the Druze community around 1930. Itzhak Ben Tzvi, an Arabist in the Joint Bureau of Arab Affairs, used his influence to obtain the release from jail of a Druze man who had been arrested for killing a Muslim policeman. In addition, Ben Tzvi visited Druze villages, wrote a report for the bureau on the need to establish good relations with the Druze in “Eretz Israel,” and, according to Parsons, “saw these acts of friendship as being a necessary precursor to the more important objective of forming links with the much more powerful and influential Druze communities in Lebanon and Syria” (p. 21). While the author notes that not all Jewish officials were eager to reach out to the Druze, the policy of “Orientation Towards the Minorities” was established in the Jewish Agency in the late 1930s.

One of the minor themes of this book is that, contrary to the assertions of some writers, there was nothing inevitable or natural about the eventual gravitation of many Palestinian Druze toward the Jews. For example, Parsons's analysis of Druze political activity during the Palestinian uprising of 1936–39 shows how pivotal this period was in the formation of Druze loyalties, with both Muslims and Jews vying for Druze support during the uprising's early months. At this time, some Druze supported the rebelling (mainly Muslim) groups, while others took the side of the Jews. According to the author, however, “the majority of Druze adopted a neutral position,” trying to “stay as uninvolved as possible in the hope that the troubles would pass them by and that they would be able to carry on with their normal lives” (p. 28). Nevertheless, some Muslim groups attacked individual Druze and whole villages because they saw the lack of Druze involvement in the uprising as a sign of “betrayal.” Consequently, Parsons states, support for the Muslim cause waned in the Druze community, with some Druze who lost relatives to reprisal attacks becoming strong supporters of the Jewish side. Parsons notes,

“Those Druze who suffered personally at the hands of the rebels were in the forefront of those who co-operated with the Jews in the 1948 war” (p. 29).

Chapters 2, 3, and 4 contain the heart of the author’s archival research on the genesis of the Jewish–Druze relationship in Palestine/Israel. They show that the political dance of the Druze and the Jews was a delicate, on-again, off-again affair, prone to pitfalls and missteps, with unease and ambivalence on both sides. The chapters cover in detail the period 1947–49, from the outbreak of the civil war in Palestine to the period immediately following the creation of Israel. Parsons states that at the outbreak of the fighting, the overall Druze reaction tended to be cautious, “to withdraw and observe,” despite the fact that “on the Jewish side there continued to be a policy of fostering links with the Druze,” and some Druze individuals were “unequivocally anti-Muslim and pro-Jewish” (p. 56).

One factor that complicated relations between the Druze and the Jews was the support given by some Druze to the Arab forces in the war. Notably, a battalion of some 500 Syrian Druze led by Shakib Wahab arrived in Palestine in March 1948. The force established itself in the Druze quarter of the village of Shafa’amr and defeated Hagana troops in the early stages of the battle of Ramat Yohana two weeks later. Some local Druze eventually participated in the fighting, but the battle was won in the end by the Hagana. In the wake of this Druze defeat, according to Parsons, those local Druze “who before the battle had established links between the Hagana and the Druze community recognized the need to rebuild bridges broken down by the events at Ramat Yohana” (p. 69). As a result, several meetings took place between Druze representatives and Jewish officials. Eventually, even Shakib Wahab saw the need to find a *modus vivendi* with the Jewish forces. By the time the civil war became the first Arab–Israeli War in May 1948, the Druze battalion had gradually melted away, in part from defeat, lack of wages, and low morale, and in part from an evaporation of tolerance on the part of the local Druze population.

As the fighting continued, Parsons says, some Jewish officers who had forged relationships with the Druze community attempted to put these to practical use. In one remarkable episode, for example, the officers met in secret with Druze leaders from the village of Shafa’amr and agreed to stage a sham battle. The Israel Defense Force (IDF) subsequently attacked the village with a loud but harmless show of force, and the Druze in response fired their bullets into the sky. As a result, the IDF won a bloodless victory, and the Druze came out unscathed and with a large degree of credibility in the eyes of Jewish leaders. Parsons goes on to show how Druze volunteers were eventually accepted into the Israeli police and armed forces, and how the deepening ties between Israeli officials and Druze leaders resulted in preferential treatment in many instances for the Druze, involving such issues as the provision of social services and landownership.

The author succeeds in adding to the nuanced picture, well grounded in the sources, that has emerged in recent years of the relationship between Israel and various Arab groups during the formative years of the state. She gives the requisite caveats regarding her Israeli sources—namely, that “the story this book tells necessarily reflects the Israeli perspective on the war and on the role of the Druze in it”. However, it is somewhat puzzling why Parsons blames “restrictions on access” for her failure to use sources from archives in Arab countries. Although it may be true that the materials available in, say, the Syrian archives are limited regarding this subject, several scholars (including some cited in her bibliography) have used them to perform research on 20th-century history and politics. In addition, the author offers no explanation of why she did not use oral sources from surviving witnesses of the events in question. Nevertheless, scholars and students specializing in the Arab–Israeli conflict will surely benefit from this lucidly written and convincingly argued book. It makes an important contribution to our understanding of Israeli–Druze relations in their formative years.

CHARLES TRIPP, *A History of Iraq* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). Pp. 328. \$59.95 cloth, \$19.95 paper.

REVIEWED BY BETTY S. ANDERSON, Department of History, Boston University

Charles Tripp, in his excellent book *A History of Iraq*, examines the means by which the Iraqi state consolidated its position throughout the country in the 20th century and, just as important, how individual Iraqis used “strategies of co-operation, subversion and resistance” (p. 1) to benefit from its services or to combat its ever-increasing power. While acknowledging that a number of alternative historical narratives can be studied, Tripp specifically places his analysis within a state-centric framework because of the pivotal role Iraq’s governmental institutions and leaders have played in reconfiguring the centers of power in the country. As a result of successive governmental activities, the state became the focal point for political power and competition, just as an increasingly narrow group of Iraqis came to hold the reins of that power.

As Tripp successfully illustrates in the case of Iraq, the state-centric narrative is a viable means by which to discuss an entire century of Iraqi history. Regardless of the type of government in power or the individuals ruling from Baghdad, three issues, he found, remained constants throughout the century. The first of these factors is the prevalence of patron–client relations, despite the fact that the state increasingly took on the trappings of a Westernized bureaucracy. Each government, from the kingship of Faisal I to the current government of Saddam Hussein, maintained its power base because of its relationship with the social networks existing in the three districts that make up the modern state of Iraq. The patrons and clients frequently changed with each government, but the reciprocal relationship between the two parties was maintained. The state needed the existing social networks to impose governmental rule throughout the country and paid these clients for this assistance by giving them greater access to government largesse. Although the relationships were often based on communal, tribal, and family connections, it is even more important that they were constructed and maintained by both the patrons and clients because of the advantages each party accrued from the affiliation.

In Tripp’s words, the new Iraqi state “demanded new forms of identity and new strategies to exploit the opportunities that presented themselves” (p. 30). The government bureaucracy, the army, and the schools served as primary agents for this patronage system and as the definers of the Iraqi national narrative, as enunciated by the state. That narrative, in all the governments formed, identified the Sunni Arab population as the dominant political group, but at times granted an enhanced status to small networks of Kurds and Arab Shi’i after they had proved their obedience or provided services to the state. Those networks that failed to prove their value found themselves alienated from the new power structure and thus incapable of providing the services their positions had allowed them under Ottoman rule.

The second factor in Iraqi history that Tripp identifies is the shifting basis of the economy. Centralized revenue collection and governmental control over much of the economy increased the ability of the state to fund its patrons and expand its services. From the earliest days of Faisal’s rule, the Iraqi government expanded the public-service sector to a greater extent than anything seen under the previous Ottoman regimes. This process was accelerated with the oil revenues that poured into the country as early as the 1950s, but in even greater amounts in the 1970s. The state could now take on the role of primary patron for the many and varied social networks throughout the country. As Tripp writes, the state’s control over the economy and the funds at its disposal “ensured the dependence of the majority of the Iraqi population on the minority who seized control of the centre” (p. 6). With each year, more social groups were brought into the state project, dependent on the services that they could acquire only from the government.

However, the continuance of the patronage system meant that the expansion of resources did not alleviate the social and economic inequalities existing in the society. Rather, it perpetuated them. This translated into greater services and resources spent on the clients who supported the state and allowed these same clients free rein to maintain the economic imbalances already present in their own social networks. Underlying this system was the axiom that the state would raise the living standards of the majority, but it would not go so far as to overturn the social hierarchies that ruled the country at the national and local level.

The last factor Tripp highlights is the use of violent measures by the various governmental leaders. This process is seen most readily in the numerous military coups that succeeded in gaining control over the decision-making process, decade after decade. The army, as in many other newly independent countries, saw itself as the guardian of the nation and of the political order, so it seized power when either appeared threatened. Once in power, the executive, the military, and the security apparatus used violence to maintain their positions and forestall yet another coup.

These three factors provide the framework for Tripp's analysis, serving as an excellent means by which to examine how a new state places itself on top of an existing system of social and political relationships, succeeding because of its financial resources and its control over the means of coercion. Although the book does not cover much new territory, with many strong texts already available as a source for modern Iraqi history, it is useful because it does provide a concise analysis of this interplay of forces. Each of the Arab states encountered similar problems incorporating old networks into new regimes and opted to use state services, funds, and resources, centralized under a small ruling oligarchy or dictatorship, to subdue, co-opt, and placate the different groups in the country. Tripp's work on Iraq can thus serve as an example for others writing about the Arab world in the 20th century.

Because of the wealth of sources used by Tripp and the clear and articulate way he presents the material, this book should be considered required reading for any survey course on the 20th-century Middle East, or one that specifically examines the role of the state in Middle Eastern history. However, because Tripp chooses to focus on the activities of the Iraqi state, supplementary texts will have to be used to look at social and economic relationships for this same period.

The only real complaint about the book actually has nothing to do with the author. Rather, it questions the audience Cambridge University Press hoped to attract with this book. The cover picture on the paperback version has a watermarked picture of King Faisal I overlaid by Saddam Husain wielding a large, automatic gun. This cover does not do justice to the content; instead, it perpetuates the stereotype the West has of the Middle East in general, and Iraq in particular, as a result of the Gulf War. Nuanced and complex works such as the one presented by Tripp should not be equated with the simplistic psychological analyses funneled to the public in the wake of that war.

AVNER GILADI, *Infants, Parents and Wet Nurses. Medieval Islamic Views on Breastfeeding and Their Social Implications* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1999). \$83.00 cloth.

REVIEWED BY JUDITH E. TUCKER, Department of History, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.

Breastfeeding, as Avner Giladi amply demonstrates, is far more than the simple matter of providing nutrition to an infant. Who breastfeeds, for how long, and with what kind of encouragement, respect, and reward can tell us much about social attitudes toward infancy and the mother-child bond, as well as the value placed on motherhood in general. The extent to which

the father alternately provides general support for mother and child or controls and limits the breastfeeding relationship, for example, can shape the father–child and husband–wife relationship in the long term. And a breastfeeding mother, as the primary nurturer of a child, finds herself in a unique position in relation to her children, her husband, and society in general: it is a moment pregnant with possibilities for the enhancement of a woman’s power. A close study of breastfeeding, then, draws our attention to a society’s attitudes toward young children, the construction of the family in relation to the needs of these children, and the ways in which relations between a husband and wife are informed by the rights and responsibilities surrounding this act of pivotal importance to the survival of the species, particularly in the days before pasteurization and infant formula, when the absence of a mother or wet nurse spelled almost certain death for a baby.

Giladi sets out to address the broad significance of breastfeeding, taking the social construction of this activity as emblematic of the treatment of women and children, and of family relations, in medieval Islamic society. Giladi is no stranger to the subject matter: his earlier work on the construction of childhood in medieval Islamic thought (*Children of Islam: Concepts of Childhood in Medieval Islamic Thought* [Houndmills and London, 1992]) provided us with a pioneering history of attitudes toward childhood in the “medieval” period. The present book is more finely focused, as the author hones in on breastfeeding as a critical aspect of early childhood that had broad repercussions for the treatment of children, marital relations, and marriage patterns.

From the outset, Giladi wrestles with the problem that dogs most social historians of the pre-16th-century Middle East—namely, the preponderance of sources of a normative or prescriptive nature. He is keenly aware that the Islamic system of “ethics” of breastfeeding as divined in Qur’an verses, commentary, and hadith literature is exactly that: an evolving ethical position that called for breastfeeding arrangements that would protect and benefit infants, a set of exhortations to honor the mother–child bond and provide for the child. We have no way of knowing the extent to which this position resonated in social practice. Still, Giladi argues plausibly that the Islamic ethical position provided a foundation for other kinds of literature that engaged society at a more immediate level—namely, medical and legal materials. He examines a number of medical treatises from the 9th through 11th centuries, noting the amount of attention that canonical and more popular medical tracts devoted to the issue of nursing, and their pronounced advocacy of breastfeeding by the mother, when possible, for around two years. The texts also provided detailed guidance in the manner of choosing a wet nurse should the mother be unable to nurse her child. This is rather indirect evidence for social practice, and Giladi is careful to note that although the views of Muslim doctors on matters such as the superiority of breast milk, the importance of maternal nutrition, and the optimum lactation period strike us as surprisingly in line with modern understandings, we cannot know the actual impact of such medical advice.

Giladi deals most fully with the legal materials on breastfeeding, taking a broad and eclectic look at works of *fiqh* and *fatāwā* from the 9th to the 16th centuries. Here the language of rights reigns supreme: breastfeeding is a right of the infant and a right of the mother, rights that must be recognized and supported by the child’s father, who was responsible for all nursing expenses. Giladi show us how legal thinkers elaborated Islamic ethical positions in such a way as to enforce a woman’s right to nurse her child and to receive the father’s support to do so. This right was not construed as a requirement, however, so that most jurists also acknowledged the right of the mother to refuse to breastfeed her baby, as long as the child’s health was not jeopardized by her decision. As with other issues in Islamic law, there was some diversity of opinion on many of the details of nursing arrangements, but overall legal doctrines backed the rights of the mother and child to a two-year nursing relationship. The works of *fiqh* most cited by Giladi are once again normative materials, telling us what Islamic legal thinkers held to be

the correct interpretation of scriptural injunctions and suggestions rather than how they approached concrete situations. The *fatawa* literature, on the other hand, stands in a somewhat different position relative to social reality. The issuers of *fatawa* were called upon to answer actual queries that originated in human experience, and therefore the situations and concerns they address, although usually framed in hypothetical terms, reflect social practice. Giladi recognizes this special quality of the *fatawa* at the outset, but then uses them only sparingly in his discussion of the legal literature. In the absence of court records from this period, more systematic attention to *fatāwā* would have helped to close the gap between the theories and practices of society that Giladi problematizes in his Introduction.

Still, the discourse of medical and legal authorities on breastfeeding, regardless of applicability to social practice, is a fascinating topic in its own right. In examining the views of these authorities, Giladi opens up a number of subjects of interest to historians of women and gender. One is the extent to which the privileging of the mother–child relationship modified or even eroded a father’s patriarchal power. We would expect legal and medical authorities, male pillars of the status quo, to tread carefully when it came to taking positions that might diminish a husband and father’s social control. The right of the mother to nurse her child as she saw fit, however, overrode the male right to control the body of his wife or the sustenance of his child; Giladi notes that the intense and independent relationship between mothers and young children could be key to the establishment of a “kingdom of the mothers,” an ongoing bond between mothers and their children, sons in particular, that countered patriarchal power. The nuances of patriarchal discourse are at issue here, and Giladi rightly presents the discourse on breastfeeding as a challenge to simplistic and monolithic analyses of the Islamic gender system. He does not set this discussion within the context of other discussions of Islam and gender, however, with the exception of one brief and somewhat dated reference. He has an important contribution to make to the history of women and gender in Islam should he choose to engage this body of literature.

A second topic of considerable interest is that of milk kinship. Giladi notes that the Islamic tradition may be unique in the attention it devotes to the creation of kinship through wet nursing. Much of the juristic discussion of breastfeeding revolves around the issue of the creation of kinship through nursing from the same woman and the many impediments to marriage that follow because of the creation of kinship within degrees forbidden for matrimony. This seemingly arcane and complex topic engaged the attention of the jurists: exactly how much nursing and which relatives were issues repeatedly chewed over in the legal literature. Although Giladi provides us with ample discussion of the detailed way in which the issue of milk kinship was broached, the social implications are less clear. Giladi speculates that the tendency for women to help with the nursing of the infants of relatives and neighbors would create a network of kin ties in families and localities, necessitating exogenous marriage arrangements. Did the elaboration of such fictive kinship constitute an attack on the practice of cousin marriage and other endogamous arrangements, an attempt to expand the relational boundaries of the community of Muslims? The prescriptive sources cannot help us here. Giladi’s attempts to discuss the motive and impact of the system of milk kinship are circumscribed by his sources.

In the final chapter of the book, which focuses on breastfeeding in practice, Giladi continues to deal with the problem posed by his material and concludes that we cannot know for certain the extent to which medical and legal writings influenced practice in the medieval period. He does offer brief remarks about breastfeeding in the 20th century, referring to anthropological accounts and modern *fatawa* as evidence for the resonance of medieval views. These observations, while of interest, take us a bit far from the major thrust of his material. A concluding chapter that engaged the major elements of the medieval discourse on breastfeeding and explored them in the context of the broader patriarchal discourse of the period would have better connected this book to the concerns of women and gender, or family, history.

The time frame of the book—Giladi refers to medical and legal literature from the 9th to the 16th centuries as well as the Qur'an and hadith—has the virtue of exposing the reader to the views of Muslim intellectuals over a long period of time, allowing for a sense of patterns and continuity in their engagement with the subject of breastfeeding. The choice of a thematic rather than chronological arrangement in the book further helps develop the idea of convergent themes and concerns in this literature. In choosing not to differentiate thinkers in space and time, however, Giladi encourages us to view the medieval period as an integrated whole, as a hermetically sealed intellectual world of fairly static dimensions. Perhaps it would not be possible to write a book of this scope that places intellectuals in some kind of relation to the state and society that shaped their world; an author always makes difficult choices in organization and approach. Still, the occasional references to elite lifestyles and interfaith relations as key to juristic concerns whet the appetite of the reader for more exploration of how historical context informed the development of the discourse on breastfeeding. Without this context, we are adrift in the period, unable to grasp why these views developed when and where they did.

In general, Giladi has made a very important contribution to our understanding of medieval views not just on breastfeeding but on gender and family relations in general. The sources are well chosen, and the arguments are carefully made. The book is not, however, very accessible to the reader outside the field of Middle East studies. Giladi assumes that the reader has some familiarity with the history and practice of Islamic law, for example, so that he does not need to explain the relationship among *fiqh*, fatwa, and court practice. Many Arabic terms and phrases in the book's main narrative are not translated, and the Arabic texts in the two appendixes are glossed and commented on but reproduced only in Arabic. It is certainly the prerogative of the author to write a book for a very specialized audience, but given the potential interest in this topic, and the novelty and richness of its treatment by the author, it seems a shame to discourage wider readership.

JUDITH E. TUCKER, *In the House of the Law: Gender and Islamic Law in Ottoman Syria and Palestine* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998). Pp. 232. \$40.00 cloth.

REVIEWED BY BOGAÇ A. ERGENE, History Department, University of Vermont, Burlington

In this book, Judith Tucker attempts to understand how gender differences, family relations, and sexuality were legally constructed in Syria and Palestine during the 17th and 18th centuries. At the same time, she explores the avenues through which women were able to exert agency and control their fates in a predominantly patriarchal social and legal environment.

Fatwa (legal opinion) collections of three muftis (jurisconsults) from greater Syria constitute the main sources of this study. These muftis are Khayr al-Din al-Ramli (1585–1671) from Ramla; Hamid al-ʿImadi (b. 1692) from Damascus; and ʿAbd al-Fattah al Tamimi (d. 1725/26) from Jerusalem. In addition to these fatwa collections, Tucker also uses six 18th-century *sijill* volumes from Damascus, Jerusalem, and Nablus (two volumes from each town) to portray the kinds of gender-related disputes and contracts that were brought to the courts.

The book is divided into five chapters. In the first chapter, the author describes her understanding of the characteristics and the nature of the relationship between legal doctrine and practice. In particular, Tucker agrees with Wael Hallaq that Islamic law continued to evolve and adapt to the changing social, political and economic conditions even after the 9th century A.D. According to the author, it is this ability to adapt that made Islamic law responsive to communal needs and attempts at policy-making.

In subsequent chapters, Tucker explores how the muftis and the courts conceptualized the

legal boundaries of marriage, divorce, child-rearing, and sexuality, and determined the rights and responsibilities of those parties involved in these activities. In these chapters, Tucker argues that although Islamic law is significantly patriarchal, the muftis and the courts were able to interpret and use it in relatively flexible ways in order to protect the rights of women. Although they were very much part of a highly gendered and male-dominated legal order, by upholding those standards in Islamic law that served women, and through a great deal of legal maneuvering, the muftis and the courts made legal practice more accommodating to the interests of women and relaxed male domination within their communities.

In this book we encounter a complex characterization of the roles and functions of the muftis in 17th- and 18th-century Syria and Palestine. According to Tucker, “[a]s part of their responsibility for the welfare of the community, the *muftis* were pledged to harmonizing gender interests as much as possible and reducing what they termed abuses. It was in this spirit that they attacked the thorny problem of entrenched social practices that violated the letter and the spirit of the law, many of which tended to disregard female rights in marriage” (pp. 66–67). Accordingly, the muftis of greater Syria had three separate but related responsibilities. First, they tried to maintain the welfare of the community and ensure social peace and harmony. Second, as legal authorities, they were responsible for enforcing the rule of law. And finally, the muftis were interested in protecting the rights and interests of women.

What is problematic in this characterization of the muftis’ duties and responsibilities is the implication that there existed no contradiction among them. Indeed, nowhere in her book does Tucker deal with the potential conflict among the mufti’s duty to uphold the shari’a, his desire to promote social harmony, and his devotion to the protection of women’s rights. This situation is surprising because we encounter examples of such a conflict on a number of occasions. In Chapter 5, for example, Tucker argues that the muftis denied family members “any defined role in the punishment of women for sexual crimes,” because they considered *zina* a crime against religion, not an offense against one’s own relatives (p. 166). We notice in this example not only that the legal responsibilities of a mufti could clash with his interest in communal appeasement, but also that Tucker’s portrayal of the muftis as dominant and assertive legal actors can be inaccurate, at least in specific instances. According to what we learn from Tucker, when dealing with unacceptable family interventions, the muftis “rarely tackled these issues close to home” (p. 176).

This reviewer believes that the author attributes too much agency to the muftis. For example, she states that “[b]y making sex with multiple partners licit for men but not for women . . . the *muftis* elaborated a legal doctrine that constructed male sexuality as a more active and demanding force than that of females” (p. 152). We know that it is the shari’a, not the muftis, that allowed men to have sex with multiple partners. And even if the muftis might have played some role in the construction of male sexuality, their contributions were probably not as consequential as Tucker gives them credit for.

This correction may seem trivial to many, but such discursive constructions help the author to attribute a reformist character to the muftis who, on some occasions, might have been trying merely to enforce the rule of law when they were pronouncing their decisions. In another instance, we find Tucker claiming that “[t]he *muftis* . . . not only held the husband responsible for *nafaqa* (material and financial support) of his wife, but also elaborated in some detail on the form this support should take” (p. 62). Again, we know that it was not a matter of preference for a qadi or a mufti to hold a husband responsible for *nafaqa*, provided that the legal conditions existed for such a payment. Nor can Khayr al-Din al-Ramli’s attempts to protect the right of the brides to collect their *mahrs* (dowries) be portrayed as evidence of this mufti’s intent to guard women against coercion in marriage arrangements.

In this sense, it is Tucker’s own insistence on representing the muftis as devoted social

reformers that is behind the contradiction that the author underlines in the following statement: “[a]lthough none of the three *muftis* was willing to countenance social practices that interfered with the proper disposition of the *mahr*, they all demonstrated a greater willingness to accept local community practice when it came to other property transfers that took place at the time of the marriage” (pp. 54–55). If we acknowledge that there are not as many legal regulations concerning the bride’s trousseau (*jihaz*) or the gifts sent by the groom to the bride’s family as there are for the *mahr*, it is only understandable that the muftis were willing to acknowledge the legitimacy of those communal practices that concerned the *jihaz* and the groom’s presents, regardless of whether they threatened the interests of the bride. After all, local custom constitutes a basis for Islamic law if it does not violate Qur’anic prescriptions; if and when it does violate the instructions of the Qur’an, however, as in the case of *mahr*, it is the responsibility of legal authorities to ignore customary practices.

In this book, the author privileges fatwa collections over court records and for this reason the contributions of the *sijills* to her arguments are limited. Furthermore, many would object to the author’s tendency to assume that “the qadis in the Islamic courts, issu[ed] judgements that actualized the doctrines espoused by the *muftis*” (p. 179), given her statement that submitting fatwas to the court “was by no means the standard procedure that it appeared to be in the core regions” (p. 21). Finally, in several instances, Tucker leads the reader to question her interpretation of the material in court records. On one occasion, for example, while trying to prove that the courts accommodated the requests by women to annul their marriages (the procedure known as *faskh*), she claims that “[t]here are no instances in which a judge refused a request for *faskh* in the case of desertion: the rules of procedure and evidence for such an annulment clearly were well understood by all parties” (p. 85). Most students of Ottoman court records would be hesitant to take the absence of denied *faskh* requests as evidence for the courts’ willingness to serve women. It is more than probable that when the court denied a *faskh* request, it simply was not recorded in the *sijills*.

Also, there are problems in Tucker’s interpretations of some fatwas that she uses in her account. For example, the very fatwa that she quotes to prove that a man “could employ the oath to divorce his wife as a sort of moral exhortation for others” curiously makes the condition of divorce entirely dependent on the actions of the husband, not on other people who were involved (pp. 106–107). In another situation, we find Tucker stretching the meaning of a different fatwa, which concerned a situation of a forced divorce under the armed threat of the wife’s brother (pp. 109–10). Interestingly, although this fatwa could legitimately be interpreted simply as the mufti’s denial of the legality of a forced divorce, according to Tucker it represented “a clear position against family interference in a couple’s marriage” (p. 110).

It is admirable that Tucker seeks in her book to challenge the conventional perceptions regarding gender issues in Islamic law and to recognize women’s ability to determine their own fates in early modern Islamic societies. Furthermore, her choice to focus on fatwa collections is praiseworthy because few studies in English make use of these sources. However, and despite the best efforts of the author, this book is generally descriptive, and its findings are not too surprising for specialists in the field; indeed, much of the discussion is a straightforward summary of Hanafi family law. And although we do occasionally run into startling claims and daring statements in the text, not all of these are well demonstrated. For example, Tucker claims that “[a] woman could transform the oath of divorce from a method of male control to a mechanism for expanding male obligation, by using it as a means of documenting marital promises” (p. 112). It is true that the oath of divorce could be beneficial for the protection of the women’s interests. The problem with this statement, however, is that nowhere in her book does Tucker demonstrate, with reference to a specific example, women’s ability to transform from being a victim to a “victimizer.”

GAIL MINAULT, *Secluded Scholars: Women's Education and Muslim Social Reform in Colonial India* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998). Pp. 373. \$35.00 cloth, \$14.95 paper.

REVIEWED BY KAMRAN ASDAR ALI, Department of Anthropology, University of Texas at Austin

The Urdu novelist and short story writer Intizar Hussayn, in his story "Ihsan Manzil," describes the anxiety produced in a northern Indian Muslim community when a magazine arrives addressed to the daughter of a respectable household. Set in the early part of the 20th century, the story depicts how the Muslim woman's name on the envelope, exposed as it was to the whole world, became a metaphor for modernity, the public, and the outside penetrating Muslim moral boundaries and domestic ethos. Similar to Hussayn's incisive depiction of changes within Indian Muslim households, Gail Minault gives us a sense of how religious reform, expanding opportunities for education for both genders, and colonial modernization in the first half of the 20th century undermined and challenged traditional aspects of middle-class Muslim life in northern India.

Minault's book is important for several reasons. It is well written, comprehensively researched, and theoretically engaged with contemporary literature on South Asia. Further, the text's emphasis on the history of the Muslim domestic sphere fills an important void in South Asian studies and becomes one of its major accomplishments.

Building on her earlier work, Minault initially discusses the social contribution of those late-19th- and early-20th-century Muslim men who responded to the challenges of a changing colonial society and prescribed new roles for Muslim women in that context. In the last chapter, she goes beyond this focus by narrating life histories of Muslim women, characterized in the text as "daughters of reform" who benefited from the social and educational changes brought about by an earlier generation. By the middle of the 20th century, these women had become socially influential, and some were founders of the women's movement (albeit elite) in Pakistan and India.

In the first two chapters, Minault focuses on the reformist tendencies in the works of 19th-century intellectuals such as Nazir Ahmad, Sayyid Ahmad Khan, and Altaf Husayn Hali. These individuals were among a group of Muslim reformers who had experienced the revolt of 1857 and the impact of British rule on their lives. Fearful of the declining social standing of the Muslim elite and the rising influence of the clerical workers and the mercantile class in post-1857 India, all of them argued for educational and social reform. Opposing the extravagance, impiety, and ignorance of the Nawabi era, which, according to them, was the cause of Muslim backwardness, they advocated pursuit of knowledge, piety, and restraint. Describing this transformation among the late 19th-century Muslim middle-class households, Minault rightly points out that there was an emphasis on being noble rather than high-born. A *sharif* (noble) gentleman was "pious without being wasteful, educated without being pedantic, and restrained in his expression of emotion" (p. 5).

Minault argues that in the late 19th century, Muslim reformers resisted the rising colonial cultural hegemony by also emphasizing the advancement of Muslim cultural heritage and, in some cases, the *shari'a*. In her assessment, both responses by Muslim religious reformers such as the Deobandi ulema and modernists such as Sayyid Ahmad Khan can be characterized by opposition to customary practice. In this context, women were asked to distance themselves from custom, which was deemed superstitious, un-Islamic, and irrational. Women, both groups argued, were supposed to be trained in religious doctrine and in household duties so they could retain the community's cultural heritage and properly train the future generations.

During the first part of the 20th century, the social influence of these early reformers and the compulsions of the "new era" led to an increased interest in women's education among

middle- and upper-middle-class Muslim families. Minault gives a detailed account of how some of this agenda was taken up by women's journals that competed for attention among a small group of literate, Urdu-speaking female readers. The issue of false custom was also revived, Minault shows, by Muslim reformers such as Mumtaz Ali in his periodical *Tahzib-i-Niswan*, which he published with his wife, Muhammadi Begum (who wrote on the topic of consent in marriage and the need for educating girls). As Minault eloquently describes, *Tahzib un Niswan*, from Lahore, was geared toward home economics, health nutrition, and education; *Khatun*, from Aligarh, served as a mouthpiece for the All India Muhammadan Educational Conference; and *Purdah Nashin* supported purdah and focused on women's household activities. And then there was Rashidul Khairi's *Ismat*, whose editorial pages persuaded women to write for the publication and was ostensibly for *sharif* Hindustani women.

The text shows how the women's voices in these journals provided alternative strategies to those of essentially upper-class men for creating citizen-subjects for the future nation. Upper-class Muslim women contested male-centered representations of the domestic, calling on their own for more education, autonomy, and independence for women. Along with areas of shared agenda and agreement with the reformist men's positions, there was also a diversity of opinion among women themselves on issues of gender segregation, wage work, secularization, veiling, and Islamic revival. However, most journals emphasized the need for women to be educated so they could improve their housekeeping and child-rearing skills (p. 133). In the larger discourse, it was clear that the responsibility for raising children, the future of the nation, could not be left to uninformed or uneducated women. The reproduction of the nation itself depended on the reorganization of how and under what circumstances children would be born and raised. To produce new kinds of individuals in the emerging moral order, women needed to be trained and trusted to fulfill the task.

This debate about women's practices among Muslims in colonial India also speaks partly to the split between the modernizing elite and the yet-to-be-modernized poor. By and large, the advice given by middle-class women in these journals was restricted to a small female readership of *sharif bibias* (respectable women) who could define and set themselves apart from the popular and coarse culture of the street and the rural areas.

In describing change within the Muslim domestic sphere, the book follows a progressivist narrative that shows women's journey from purdah to the public sphere—a movement that, at the time, was clearly thought of in opposition to women's customary practices. There is no doubt that education and unveiling created new opportunities for middle-class Muslim women, but these freedoms came at the cost of other spaces of potential autonomy (e.g., the *zenana*, women's quarters in middle-class households) that were not constantly under men's surveillance. Respectable women did give up seclusion to participate more fully in public life, but the terms under which these transformations occurred were linked to a new morality defined largely by men.

In this context, Minault's otherwise impressive text does not adequately address the "silences" and "new disciplines" that women had to acquire as a price of their own "liberation." It also does not represent the histories of rural and underprivileged women. More precisely, it does not include voices of those Muslim women who worked in fields and factories, those who lived in urban poor neighborhoods, and those who labored as domestic servants—women whose cultural experience of veiling and seclusion lay in a different register from that of those who lived within the boundaries of *sharif* households. A focus on these voices could suggest an alternative narrative on liberation and freedom.

Minault may have legitimate reasons for not including these histories—reasons that, for example, have to do with the lack of availability of primary research material. Also, she does not claim to engage in the history of all Indian Muslim women. Her pioneering work, however,

does shed light on the significant, and yet much ignored, subject of reform within middle-class Indian Muslim households. In doing so, her study becomes a crucial building block for further research on more diverse and critical histories of Muslim life in colonial India.

ZIBA MIR-HOSSEINI, *Islam and Gender: The Religious Debate in Contemporary Iran* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999). Pp. 329.

REVIEWED BY NAYEREH TOHIDI, Department of Women's Studies, California State University, Northridge

This book is unique in several ways. It is the product of unprecedented research collaboration between a Muslim feminist female anthropologist (Ziba Mir-Hosseini), based and educated in the West, and a Muslim feminist male cleric (Hujjat al-Islam Sayyid Muhsin Sa'ïd Zadih), based and educated in Islamic seminaries in Iran. For the first time, the Qom seminary (Hawzih)—the center of religious and political power of Shi'i clerics—opened its doors to a feminist female scholar, letting her engage in a face-to-face encounter on gender issues with several prominent Islamic ulema (clerical scholars). Much of the book is a transcription of dialogues between Mir-Hosseini and eminent clerics in the Iranian religious seminaries in the city of Qom. The central concern of these dialogues is the way religious knowledge is produced in Shi'i Islam and the complex relationship among the believer, religious authority, and political action.

Mir-Hosseini's book—though informed by books previously written with the same central concern (Michael Fischer [1980] and Roy Mottahedeh [1985])—is distinct from the earlier works for at least two reasons. First, her starting point in time is post-revolutionary, post-Khomeini Iran, reflecting the time of a lively debate in 1995 over the very concept of authority in Shi'ism and a transitional stage in the Hawzih in Qom. Second, she puts the focus on women, a subject that was marginal in the previous works.

These fascinating debates show that a growing number of Islamists, in general, and the powerful Shi'i clerics, in particular, are being compelled to respond to modern realities concerning women, such as higher literacy rates and educational levels among women as well as men; increasing social and political presence of modern women; feminist critiques (from both secular and Islamic perspectives) of patriarchal traditions, despotism, and violence; and growing demands for democracy and equal civil and human rights. We learn that seizure of technologically advanced and bureaucratically complex modern state power by the clerics has inevitably affected their personal lifestyles, socio-economic status, intra-marriage dynamics, family experiences, and intellectual and theological perceptions in post-revolutionary Iran. To maintain their political power and to attract a female electoral constituency, a growing number of clerics are trying to produce a new narrative on women and gender issues that will modify the patriarchal orientation of the traditional Islamic *fiqh* (jurisprudence). These gender debates between Mir-Hosseini and clerics in Qom are not based on just an academic or intellectual encounter. Most of the clerics interviewed are those who have held or are still connected to governmental positions in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Through their texts they have sought to translate their theories and notions about gender into a vigorously enforced policy concerning gender. In contrast, Mir-Hosseini, a Muslim feminist, feels compelled to challenge and discredit the patriarchal worldviews of these clerics in favor of a more egalitarian gender system.

Mir-Hosseini notes that, in Iran as elsewhere in the Muslim world, women who acquired a feminist consciousness in either a Western or an indigenous form have always faced a tension between the different components of their identity: their Muslimness is perceived as backward and oppressed, yet authentic and innate; their feminism is perceived as progressive and emanci-

pated, yet corrupt and alien (p. 9). The anti-West and “anti-imperialist” discourse of the 1970s and 1980s deepened the perceived divide between Islam and feminism, forcing many Iranian women—religious and secular—to re-examine and redefine the relationship between their faith (Islam) and feminism, thus opening a new phase in the politics of gender and the politics of feminist theorization in Muslim societies. A crucial element in this politics, Mir-Hosseini observes, is that “it has created a space in which a critique of the fundamental gender assumptions in Islamic law can be sustained in ways that were impossible until very recently” (p. 10).

The role of religious texts and various theological currents and interpretations (modernist or traditionalist) should not be overemphasized. Women’s daily lives, their social status, and even the way and extent of enforcement of the legal and religious (shari’a) codes are determined by local customs and by historical, socio-economic, and political factors (especially state gender policies) of each society more so than by the religious texts and theological debates. Yet, as Dale Eickelman has correctly argued, “Debates within the clerical establishment itself remain a powerful engine for social change.” This is particularly true in the present context of Iran, where domination of political and state power by clerics has brought sacred aspects and clerical debates to a mundane level, associating many of the daily problems of citizens and failures of state operation with discriminatory and oppressive nature of traditional *fiqh* and shari’a rulings.

By examining key passages in written texts of several influential clerics and by narrating her meetings and discussions with them, Mir-Hosseini introduces debates among adherents of three main approaches to gender issues in present Shi’i Islam: the inequality or traditionalist approach, whose advocates such as Ayatollah Madani-Tabrizi and Ayatollah Aziri-Qumi insist on patriarchal interpretations based on “natural” inequality but “complementarity” between women and men; the neo-Traditionalist approach, represented by Ayatollah Javadi-Amuli and Ayatollah Yusuf Sanih-i and male clerical editors of *Payam-i Zan*, a journal on women published in Qom, that tries to introduce “balance” into traditionalist interpretations; and the equality approach, represented by Hojjat al-Islam Sa’idzadih and Ayatollah Ibrahim Jannati, that is engaged in “radical” rethinking of the jurisprudential constructions of gender. Advocates of the equality approach are “prepared to go beyond old *fiqh* wisdom in search of new answers for new questions” and display “a refreshing pragmatic vigor and a willingness to engage with nonreligious perspectives” (p. 213).

The change in the Hawzih, especially in the way women’s issues are perceived, is enormous when these current debates are compared with Hawzih thinking twenty or thirty years ago. In the 1970s, those clerics who addressed the “issue of women” were perceived as outcasts. At present, “the very fact that the Houzeh sees addressing women’s issues as a duty is itself indicative of how much has changed” (pp. 107–108). Yet we are also aware that there are still negative repercussions for the clerics who devote their time and energy to women’s issues and to publications on women (p. 109). Some, such as Sa’idzadih, may be defrocked, and some, such as Yusufi Ishivari, may end up in jail.

Mir-Hosseini’s book represents first-rate scholarship based on methodically diligent anthropological fieldwork. It is conceptually well organized, well written, thorough in literature review, and meticulous in its documentation and use of primary and secondary sources. It is by far the most insightful, engaging, and illuminating contribution to our understanding of the vigorous gender debates within the Shi’i Islamic framework. I highly recommend this book for the reading list of any graduate-level course dealing with gender studies and religion, especially Islamic discourses within contemporary Muslim and Islamicate communities.

HOSSEIN ALIKHANI, *Sanctioning Iran: Anatomy of a Failed Policy* (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2000). Pp. 448. \$95.00 cloth.

REVIEWED BY JALIL ROSHANDEL, Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, Stanford, Calif.

In *Sanctioning Iran: Anatomy of a Failed Policy*, Hossein Alikhani has successfully organized a useful source that includes various ways to understand the American sanction policy. Numerous aspects of the policy have been elaborated in a book that contains ten chapters, a bibliography, and an index. The book provides an excellent and up-to-date, systematic accounting of the sanction's process.

Considering the ongoing debates on renewal of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) of 1996 for another five years, Alikhani's book is a highly relevant study of the unsuccessful economic sanction policy toward Iran. In particular, it addresses some of the most important issues raised by various analysts as to how and why sanctions are used by the United States as a policy instrument. What makes this study different from others is the author's focus on definitions, as well as his ability to use a wide range of documents to provide not only a pathology of sanctions imposed on Iran but also a typology of sanctions in general. In the course of doing this, Alikhani scrupulously examines the details of events during the past two decades and explores the years after Iranian Revolution of 1979.

Alikhani's book provides a history of sanctions in the 20th century, with special attention to the role of sanctions in American foreign policy. In his preface, the author defines the purpose of the book in the following fashion: "to explore US sanctions against Iran in depth, to examine their history and current status, as well as their political and economic impact, and the conditions under which they were imposed". Although the subtitle of the book leads the reader to believe that sanctioning Iran has been a "failed" policy, one still needs to ask why and how such a policy was extended for another five years. Alikhani's search for an answer leads him to a historical examination of U.S.–Iranian bilateral relations. He maintains that the seeds of distrust between Iran and the United States grew both under the Shah and under the rule of the Islamic Republic that came to power in 1979.

Alikhani deliberates on the U.S. administration's unsuccessful efforts in 1995 to pressure its allies to limit trade with Iran and reminds the reader that only El Salvador, Israel, Ivory Coast, and Uzbekistan expressed support for a trade ban against Iran. A statement issued later at a Group of Seven summit called on Iran simply "to participate constructively in regional and world affairs." In fact the United States failed to convince its allies to support the policy, and in the aftermath of the summit, the French oil company, Total, signed the contract originally given to the U.S. firm Conoco, which was forced by the U.S. administration to withdraw from the deal.

Benjamin Gilman, then the chairman of the International Relations Committee of the House of Representatives, was the chief sponsor of the D'Amato bill. It is interesting to note that once again, in June 2001, Gilman played his role as the promoter of the case and succeeded in getting enough votes to extend the sanctions until 2006. Representative Gilman strongly opposed shortening the extension to two years, as sought by the Bush administration, and apparently persuaded members of the committee (pp. 34–39) by resorting to the same allegations he had put forward five years earlier. At the end, the House of Representatives voted 409–6 for extending ILSA for another five years, followed by the Senate's favorable vote of 96–2.

Most analysts and scholars acknowledge that in the aftermath of successive landslide victories by the reform movement since 1997, Iran can no longer be isolated by a failed and archaic policy. If the policy is aimed at confronting terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, or Iranian opposition to the Middle East peace process, it has already proved its ineffectiveness. Therefore, renewal of ILSA will not help to solve these problems. The law was en-

acted unilaterally by Washington to punish any firm that invests more than \$20 million in the energy sector of Iran or Libya, but since its enforcement no penalties have been slapped on any foreign firm, thus proving the ineffectiveness of extraterritorial sanctions. Today, the United Nations rejects extraterritorial sanctions; European and Japanese firms ignore them; and even American companies have begun to deal with Iran through their Russian connections. Many policy analysts and U.S. scholars argue that unilateral sanctions in general, and ILSA in particular, have not accomplished their primary objectives. In a project report sanctioned by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Ernest H. Preeg questions the past, present, and future of such policies and says that, as of early 1999, they are having an adverse impact on American interests. So, as Alikhani's book suggests, only strong domestic political considerations, such as pressure from interest groups, have shaped the sanction policy and continue to support it.

In the ten rather long chapters that constitute this book, almost nothing is left unexplored, as the author has professionally collected all of the available data on sanctions and the recent history of the relations between Iran and the United States. According to Alikhani, sanctions and American foreign policy historically have gone hand in hand. He views sanctions as a multi-dimensional process and maintains that its extraterritoriality principle contradicts its domestic motivation. Although Iran's support for international terrorism, opposition to the Middle East peace process, and development of weapons of mass destruction are publicly presented as the main reasons for imposing the sanctions, they are, at the same time, believed to be related to the strong Israeli lobby in the United States.

The book examines both external and international factors and argues that the United States did not succeed in imposing the use of a sanctions regime on its allies. This resulted in the failure of unilateral extraterritorial sanctions while severely damaging the economic interests of American firms and companies. The author, like most experts on this subject, recognizes that "these measures have had little adverse impact on the Iranian economy, while their cost to the United States outweighs the potential benefits". Alikhani agrees with the proposition that the "logical conclusion is that it is in the U.S. interest to lift these sanctions unilaterally". However, despite the sweeping victory of Iranian reformists in recent elections, the author does not see the unilateral lifting of the sanctions as likely because of the great influence of the Israeli lobby on many Capitol Hill legislators. Yet *Sanctioning Iran*, like many other similar works, does not satisfactorily address the critical question of whether countries such as Iran and Libya could have been economically better off if they had not confronted such sanctions in the course of their recent histories.

Overall, this book is a great contribution to our present knowledge on non-violent sanctions. For the most part, the author's ability to consult a wide range of sources has made his analysis rich and nuanced. He also provides a critical mass of arguments and evidence to show how and why the sanctions regime against Iran has not been successful so far. In some chapters, the author simply expands the text of legal documents that have not been discussed elsewhere. In such cases, the discussion remains limited within the confine of laws and regulations and their technical evolution, with rare external attributions. This is the case with documents number 2, 3, and 4, but also with Chapter 5. Apparently for technical and relevance reasons, the author decided to make the full text of documents, to which he has added his analysis, full chapters, not appendixes at the end. Some of these documents could have been easily placed in appendixes using smaller type fonts, thus making the book less lengthy. Nevertheless, the author's in-depth examination of such documents helps us to understand better the interrelationship of the expansion of sanctions against Iran and the hostage crisis, on the one hand, and the content analysis of the Algiers Declaration, on the other. A complete bibliographical list consisting more than 250 publications enables the reader to find other related sources on the subject in addition to the sources referred to in the footnotes. An index of proper names, geographical names, and conceptual words further enhances the value of this book.

Sanctioning Iran is a book that should be welcomed and read by those interested in international relations, political economy, and political science, as well as by students of related fields, though they may find it relatively expensive as a textbook.

NADIA ABU-ZAHRA, *The Pure and the Powerful: Studies in Contemporary Muslim Society* (Reading, Berkshire, U.K.: Ithaca Press, 1997). Pp. 340. \$45.00 cloth, \$21.00 paper.

REVIEWED BY VINCENT F. BIONDO III, Department of Religious Studies, University of California at Santa Barbara

The Pure and the Powerful, the second book by the Oxford-based anthropologist Nadia Abu-Zahra, is a case study of the rituals performed at the Cairo shrine of al-Sayyida Zaynab, patron saint of women, during the anniversaries of her birth and death. Considered by many to be the granddaughter of the Prophet Muhammad, al-Sayyida Zaynab is the epitome of purity and has the power to heal the sick. Abu-Zahra sees religious practices at the shrine as a demonstration of Islam and Egyptian society's "integrated wholeness." In short, the beliefs and practices of common people, intellectual elites, men, and women are more analogous than previously thought.

In particular, Abu-Zahra challenges Michael Gilson's argument in *Recognizing Islam* (Croom Helm, 1984) that there is a wide gap between the Islam of the ulama scholars and the Islam practiced by common people. For Abu-Zahra, the ulama and their *fatawa* serve as intermediaries between classic texts and popular culture. As the daughter of the well-known Islamic legal scholar Muhammad Abu-Zahra, the author's enriched perspective on the workings of the ulama lends authority to her conclusions. Her nuanced argument explains how illiterate practitioners, with much of the Qur'an memorized, act out and perform the text. This level of textual rendering is not necessarily less authoritative or authentic than more academic renditions.

Abu-Zahra also contests the thesis that women are less knowledgeable about Islam than men, as proposed by Lila Abu-Lughod in "Islam and the Gendered Discourses of Death" (*IJMES* 25 [1993]:187–205) and Richard Antoun in *Muslim Preacher in the Muslim World* (Princeton University Press, 1989). Abu-Zahra argues that women are as central as men in the family rituals practiced at the shrine. The clearest difference between the practices of men and women is that the men often behave more emotionally.

The al-Sayyida Zaynab section begins with a story about the death of the author's mother, followed by literary references to Youssef Idris, Yehya Haqqi, and Abdel-Hakim Qasim. This lends a uniquely personal tone to the ethnography. Abu-Zahra is knowledgeable about symbolic and material Egyptian culture and explains in detail aspects of the ritual, such as food preparation. She completes her study with references to the Qur'an and the works of Shaykh Shaltut and Al-Tabari.

Although the bulk of the book focuses on the shrine of al-Sayyida Zaynab, there is a shorter study, inserted at the beginning, explaining the relevance of the author's earlier fieldwork in Sidi Ameur. Examining rain rituals during periods of drought in the Sahel of Tunisia from the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s, the author concludes that rain rituals are "rites of spiritual passage from disobedience to God to reverence for Him". Using original Arabic sources, the author is able to elucidate concepts such as *rahma*, which means both "rain" and "divine" mercy. The inclusion of this chapter strengthens Abu-Zahra's critique of Ernest Gellner's distinction between traditional rural customs, or *baraka*-based "tribal Islam," and the ulama's Islamic beliefs based on the rational interpretation of textual sources. For Abu-Zahra, traditional customs, Islamic practice, and Islamic belief are closely linked.

This book is indispensable to Egyptian anthropologists in dialogue with Gellner; it will also be useful to scholars or students interested in ritual studies, Islamic studies, or women in Egypt and it gives us insights into the complex “web of relationships” underlying Muslim society and the Egyptian cult of saints.

Abu-Zahra’s objections to the theories of other anthropologists may be exaggerated. In particular, her goal of proving Gellner incorrect leads her to overemphasize the integrated “wholeness” of Islam in Egypt. Her methodology of combining texts and practices is effective, however, and she succeeds in raising the status of women and common people in scholarship. Her fieldwork on the family rituals at the shrine of al-Sayyida Zaynab provide the reader with a descriptive ethnographic picture that serves as an excellent supplement to Andrea Rugh’s overview of women in working-class Cairo. Some readers may want further clarification on the relationship of the ulama to the religious practice of the common people. Perhaps this will be elucidated in Abu-Zahra’s future work.

FOROUGH JAHANBAKHS, *Islam, Democracy and Religious Modernism in Iran (1953–2000) from Bazargan to Soroush* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2001).

REVIEWED BY AHMAD KAZEMI MOUSSAVI, International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia

This work is a critically informative study of religious modernism in Iran from 1953 to 2000 in the context of Islam versus democracy. It examines the thoughts and works of seven religious intellectuals who either shaped or influenced the religious-political developments of contemporary Iran. According to Jahanbakhsh, although Iranians have failed in understanding the meaning of democracy, the yearning for democracy was the most enticing goal in both the 1906 and 1979 Iranian revolutions.

The study mainly covers two major themes and time spans: religious modernism and democracy before the Islamic Revolution of 1979 and post-revolutionary religious intellectuals and democracy. In the first part, the author examines the place of democracy in the thoughts of Ayatollah Taliqani (d. 1979), Mahdi Bazargan (d. 1995), Ali Shariati (d. 1977), Ayatollah Tabataba’i (d. 1980), Ayatollah Mutahhari (d. 1979), and Ayatollah Khomeini (d. 1989). The author dedicates the second part to a discussion of the application of the principle of “epistemological pluralism” by Abdulkarim Soroush to democracy. Jahanbakhsh appropriately presents two introductory chapters to explain key concepts that should bridge Muslim modernist thought and democracy. She adds another chapter on the emergence of Shi’i intellectualism in modern Iran covering the rise of religious modernism before 1953. And in an epilogue, she evaluates the effects of a new wave of religious modernism after the 1997 Iranian presidential election. In dealing with certain major features of “democracy” and its inter-related principles, such as equality, liberty, and majority rule, the author deliberately bypasses any discussion of the historical development of theories of democracy and the various forms democracy has taken. This omission indeed has helped the brevity and control of the issues at hand, but at certain points in the book the absence of such a historical perspective seems to widen the gap between the Muslim and Western understandings of democracy. It is understood that “democracy” is an essentially contested concept. Nevertheless, in examining Muslims’ perception of democracy, this work gives the impression (especially in Chapter 2) that a clearly defined model of democracy existed that Muslims kept failing to grasp. In fact, al-Farabi and Ibn Rushd used *jama’iya* (collective participation) in the same sense that the Greek and other European thinkers of the time used democracy. Furthermore, we should bear in mind that until the 19th century, the underlying assumptions of representative rule were absent from the European arena, as well.

In the search for “democratic norms in Islam,” Chapter 2 examines the Islamic conceptions of “justice,” “*jama’iyya* (democracy parallel to the Greek sense),” “freedom” (including apostasy), “equality” (covering problems on religious minorities, slavery, the male-female dichotomy), and, finally, Muslim means of public participation in politics, which consists of a short discussion on the principles of *shūrā* and *bay’a*. The author concludes this discussion by maintaining that “the issues of divine sovereignty and legislation” are “stumbling blocks in the way of democracy” (p. 49). These obstacles, however, are surprisingly diminished in importance in Chapter 5, in which Jahanbakhsh delineates Soroush’s hermeneutic approach regarding “religious society” (*jāmi’ih-i dīnī*). Soroush certainly does not exclude divine sovereignty and legislation from his proposed religious society. What he does is open divine legislation (the *sharī’a*) to his so-called epistemological pluralism. Soroush distinguishes “religion” from “religious knowledge.” While the former is immovable, the latter is contextual and open to the changing requirements of any given time. In Soroush’s terminology, “religion” appears to mean that inner faith, or *gawhar-i dīnī*, that philosophizes life, whereas “religious knowledge” refers to the application of any knowledge to religion. For this reason, the author’s translation of “*sharī’a*” as “religious knowledge” (p. 146) agrees with the semantics of Soroush’s argument. In Muslim juridical works, “*sharī’a*” usually designates the divine law, whereas *fiqh* designates the understanding of that law. Soroush, however, makes *sharī’a* a subject for contraction (*qabz*) and expansion (*bast*), whose implications go far beyond the sphere of *fiqh*.

Soroush’s proposal for the religious-democratic government centers on the creation of a “faith-based society,” as opposed to “*fiqh*-based society.” What such a religious society should not be is discussed fairly in the book (pp. 153–62), whereas what it should be is not adequately discussed, especially concerning the composition of such a society. In the latter part of this section, we learn that democratic-religious government benefits from the collective mind of the society and would follow ethical norms that have extra religious values. “Methods of governance,” Soroush argues, “are essentially non-religious because they deal with how to plan and administer different aspects of life” (p. 157). Human reason plays a dominant role in both the understanding of religion and administering the government. By naming this argument “fluctuating rational understanding of religion” (p. 160) and “creeping liberalism” (p. 170), the author expresses her worries about how Soroush is supposed to concretize many undefined concepts, such as “collective mind of the society” and “arbitration of the faithful” into societal institutions. Indeed, one may not expect this work to illustrate Soroush’s debt to such Western thinkers as Karl Popper and John Rawls, yet the reasons for which Soroush was charged with positivism, liberalism, and historicism (p. 163) deserve more explanation.

One way to look at the practicality of Soroush’s proposed doctrines for the “faith-based society” is to draw comparisons between them and the past praxis of Muslim society. From among several doctrinal institutions that provide grounds for public participation, the author picks *ijma’* (consensus), which can put the general body of believers in a position of decision-making. As a component of *ijma’*, the popularity of an opinion (*shuhra*) often functions as “the expressed will of the community.” This is also true with the Shi’i practice of *ijma’*, although Shi’is formally include another constituency—namely, the word of an infallible imam—in their definition of *ijma’*. Besides *ijma’*, the principles of *shūrā* and *bay’a*, could be considered conduits to channel the will of the community. Soroush, however, believes that the problem should be solved on a deep theoretical plane, and that “reworking certain of its older institutions is fatally flawed” (p. 159). He does not give any value to even the communicative role of these institutions with the masses. For this reason, Soroush’s ideas remain influential on the intellectual plane today and will perhaps later prove influential in the educational sphere.

In relation to democracy and Islam, the book does not entertain the important questions of why and how the Islamic government of post-revolutionary Iran—more than the previous

regimes—provided freedom of press and free elections from which prominent figures such as Soroush and Sayyid Muhammad Khatami emerged. This should be acknowledged, despite similar misconduct of the Islamic regime in other spheres (political, economical, and judicial). One answer, besides the rise of an Iranian intellectual force, may be found in the advanced scope of juridical expressions that has developed in the Shi'i milieu since the 20th century and that was crystallized in the fatawas of Shirazi (d. 1894) and the ulema of the constitutional era. During the course of development of *ijtihad*, the ulema promoted the principle of *rukhsa* (concessionary law) among themselves to express their own opinions, and among the lay people to choose whichever *mujtahid* they preferred to pose their questions to (e.g., see Mirza Abu'l-Qasim Qummi, *Qawanin al-Usul* [Litho, 1958], 384). The widespread currency of juridical manuals (*risāla 'amaliya*) in 20th-century Iran is an outcome of such efforts. The effect of such processes can be seen in the present constitution and in the practice of the Islamic Republic. Indeed, it is still confined to the limits of a *rukhsah* (a break), because the idea of “representation of the peoples' sovereignty” and “the rule of public will” have not yet acquired their proper institutional forms.

The author is on more solid ground in her search for the anti-dictatorial character of modernist Muslim approaches to democracy. Only in this context can the seven religious thinkers mentioned earlier be viewed on the same plane. Otherwise, it would be difficult to trace any democratic component in the thought and practices of some of these thinkers. Ayatollah Tabataba'i explicitly excludes democracy from Islam because the notion of “truth finding” is so strong in his thought that it leaves no room for appreciating the role of the public in decision-making (p. 115). Similarly, while Ayatollah Khomeini was not so expressive, he did manage to implement one of the most severe anti-democratic theories (*vilāyat-i faqih*), and further, as the writings of Muhsin Kadivar have aptly demonstrated, he played so politically on words that it reduced his theory to mere power politics.

Sources of the study are generally well researched. Nevertheless, except for Chapter 5 (on Abdulkarim Soroush), there seems to be a sizeable reliance on secondary material from which the author drew her information and subsequent judgments. One can point to two clear errors in the book that resulted from such reliance. Ayatollah Khomeini, “along with Ayatollah Burujirdi,” did not oppose the Shah's reforms on women's rights, as the book states (p. 135). Neither the Shah nor Ayatollah Khomeini launched such reform and opposition before the death of Ayatollah Burujirdi in 1961. With regard to Burujirdi's status as the sole *marja'* of his time, Khomeini was not then in a position to launch an opposition to the Shah, either with Burujirdi or independent from him. Concerning Ayatollah Muntaziri's view on the role of people in government (p. 136), his position differs from Ayatollah Khomeini's in that Muntaziri envisaged the “true leadership” to be realized and carried out by the contract (or collective actions) of the people (see the chapter on *bay'ah* in his *Dirasat fi Wilayat al-Faqih*) whereas Khomeini saw no role for the people in the assignment of *wilāyah* by God.

FRED HALLIDAY, *Nation and Religion in the Middle East* (London: Saqi Books, 2000). Pp. 251. £29.50 cloth, £14.95 paper.

REVIEWED BY LOUIS J. CANTORI, Department of Political Science, University of Maryland, Baltimore

This volume collects some original chapters and some reprinted ones by a very well-known scholar of the Middle East. The chapters tend to be linked to one another by theoretical themes developed in the introductory chapters. These eleven chapters, plus a concluding one, “The Middle East at 2000: The Millennial Illusion,” appear under three headings.

The first of these headings is "Political Theory and Nationalist Ideology." The first political theory addressed is that of liberal theory and nationalism. Halliday has a particular quarrel with liberal theory because of what he terms its "hegemonic abstentionism" on moral and human-rights issues. He says that its liberal principles are in effect reserved for the developed European world, and when it comes to these issues in the Middle East, the dominant power supporting these principles abstains on the grounds of cultural relativism from making judgments on political justice and human rights. In other words, liberal theory is in fact not universal. Halliday's discussion is focused and rigorous in the critical analysis of the application of the philosophy of the important liberal theorist John Rawls and of the thinking of Walzer and Etzioni. There is an attractive indignation behind this argument against not only philosophical historicism but also the historicism of the social sciences. Halliday then proceeds to deny the universalism not only of liberalism, but also of moral philosophy and religion in general. In his view, these are in effect time-bound ideologies, which are the product of a particular historical era. Even in the present era, these are only contingent ideas reflecting the distribution and rationalization of power. People, however, share political space with one another, and therefore the universal codes that exist need to be applied. Of what might these "universal codes" consist? The answer, according to Halliday, is "enlightenment universalism." Thus, his argument ends where it began. In other words, like most Western scholars, Halliday is trapped in his search for universal principles by the circularity of the reasoning of his historicist assumptions. But he differs from most of them in his passion for justice and the energy of his effort to dispel the problem.

In Chapter 2, "The Middle East and the Nationalism Debate," one finds a very rigorous and even original treatment of the subject. True to his historicist inclinations, Halliday rejects the argument of the "perennialists" (the term is Anthony Smith's) holding that the historical nature of national identity is an inherited given. We are what we have been. Instead, Halliday opts for the contemporary construction of national identity, or "modernism." He develops the idea from Ernst Gellner that the state precedes the nation, and it is the state that shapes, guides, and constructs the nation. In his hands, this becomes a very illuminating and clarifying argument. It leads him, logically according to his assumptions, to deny what might be termed "Middle Eastern exceptionalism," or the alleged transnational and "universal" character of Arabism and Islamism. This leads him to what I have termed "Arabism or Islamism in one country"—that is, the reconciliation of universal formulations to the reality of the state and nationalism in the contemporary Middle East. This point of view is illustrated in Chapter 3 as a case study, "History and Modernity in the Formation of Nationalism: The Case of Yemen." There, Halliday traces the complex matter of state construction in Yemen and the subtleties of the building of the Yemeni nation.

A strong feature of the volume is Halliday's ability to think conceptually and theoretically about important issues. This is also the case in Chapter 4, "Terrorisms in Historical Perspective." Here he is able to combine a need for moral criticism of terrorism while clarifying the understanding of the phenomenon. He notes that one can make a distinction between "terrorism from above" and "terrorism from below." The former, or state terrorism, often occurs without being labeled as such. The reason is that such acts of violence against non-combatants are explained and legitimized as enforcement actions by a sovereign state, and this action by the strong against the weak is somehow self-justifying. The latter, however, is political violence by the weak against the strong and is more likely to be condemned. Halliday's point is that such violence from above and below, when directed against non-combatants, may be morally condemned, but the right of the weak to resist repression cannot be denied. His treatment of the subject is careful and well defined, but it also understates the complexity of the subject. For example, Halliday notes that terrorism is particularly vicious in communal conflict, such as that of the Israelis and Palestinians, and must be especially criticized. This point of view fails to note the ingrained qualities of the terrorism from above committed by the Israelis against a civil population from the ethnic cleansing of 1948–49 until the present degradations.

In classic Simmelian fashion, like has begotten like, so that the assumed exceptional character of the moral evil of terrorism is now routine by both sides. Not only that, but the power imbalance is so skewed that the Palestinians have little recourse except terror. In moral terms, evil has become the norm on both sides, a fact that is perhaps unfathomable to the intrinsic optimism of Anglo-Saxon thought.

The second part of the book deals with "Modernity and the State." Chapter 5, "The Fates of Monarchy in the Middle East," would seem to present the author with an intellectual challenge to his historicism. Eight monarchies are still exercising real power in the world, and they are all in the Middle East. If all political institutions and nationalisms are contingent to an era, how does one account for the survival of historically defined monarchies? Halliday's answer is that the monarchy is, in effect, similar to the modern state in that it adjusts, adapts, and creates its own political circumstances. To a degree this is true, but it ignores the historical weightiness of monarchy that is apparent to subject and scholar alike. Halliday himself concedes that the remaining monarchies are likely to persist. In ignoring history, tradition, and religion, he cannot explain why. Chapter 6, on the conflict of the Arabs and the Persians, by contrast, is illuminated by Halliday's historicism. His argument is that the idea of a historical rivalry of the two peoples is in fact a creation of the rivalry for political power between Iraq and Iran. His effort to deal with Islamism in Iran and Tunisia (Chapter 7), again from the point of view of contingency concludes correctly that Islam is not an instrument of foreign policy that will destabilize the region. However, Halliday anticipates that Islam will be destabilizing domestically because of its divisiveness and its inability to respond to modern societal needs. If religion is an ideology that merely reflects political and economic forces, then one can draw this conclusion. If, however, Islam is a faith that possesses its own teleology, and therefore is an independent variable, then it can perhaps achieve these things and contribute to political stability. This can be seen in the potential of political participation in Egypt and the reality in Jordan, to say nothing of Iran twenty-two years after the revolution.

Halliday goes on to present analyses of Tehran (1979), Saudi Arabia (1997), Turkey (1998), and the Arab population of Manchester, England, in the 19th century under the heading "Reportages."

Halliday's Conclusion, "The Middle East at 2000: The Millennial Illusion," correctly communicates his pessimism. He sees as enduring patterns continued economic dependence of the region, with globalization passing it by; continued domination of authoritarianism; continued suspicion among the states of the region; and continued absence of cultural freedom. Finally, Halliday states that two moral principles stand at the center of the concept of rights: the right to resist authoritarian power and the moral worth of the individual. Where might these principles show themselves? The answer is in the three great religions of the region. This appears to be further evidence of the intellectual open-mindedness he demonstrates through out the volume. So much for historicism! Halliday shares his historicism with most fellow social scientists. Unlike them, however, he is critical of it and recognizes its shortcomings.

DENIS J. SULLIVAN AND SANA ABED-KOTOB, *Islam in Contemporary Egypt: Civil Society versus the State* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999). Pp. 170. \$49.95 cloth, \$12.76 paper.

REVIEWED BY W. JUDSON DORMAN, Department of Political Studies, School of Oriental and African Studies, London

This concise and accessible introduction to the subject of Islamist movements in Egypt will be useful for those seeking a point of entry. More experienced students of the subject, however, may not find much new empirical material in this book. They may also disagree with the

authors' reliance on the civil-society interpretive paradigm to the exclusion of other approaches and their sometimes schematic treatment of Islamist groups.

Denis Sullivan and Sana Abed-Kotob have an ambitious project: "to describe the various Islamist movements in contemporary Egypt with an eye on their historical evolution; to discuss issues of civil society and the role Islamist groups play in society as a whole; and to examine the conflict between the state and the society it seeks to control, not just govern" (p. 1). Use of the civil-society framework—with emphasis on groups practicing such virtues as civility, non-violence, and tolerance—has its advantages and disadvantages. For example, it is a potentially useful rejoinder to those who would claim that Islamist opposition movements in the Middle East are scarcely more pluralistic and civic-minded than the authoritarian governments they confront.

Still, because Egypt's leaders have managed to stifle most bottom-up political activity, the authors' normative focus on civil society risks becoming simply a discussion of how the state has suppressed it. This, in turn, obscures the politically interesting roles that Islamist groups, democratically inclined or otherwise, continue to play in Egyptian society. The social-movements literature—which explicitly takes up questions of how groups organize and mobilize vis-à-vis authoritarian regimes—might have provided a more useful framework.

In their second chapter, the authors illustrate the richness of their conception of civil society by focusing on the diversity of the Egyptian Islamist movement. Their discussion of Islamic welfare associations and nongovernmental organizations—and the important social-welfare functions they serve in Egyptian society—is a useful corrective to stereotypes treating all such groups as composed of armed militants. Further, they make the valuable sociological observation that, in some such religiously organized associations, Islam largely operates as a "cover" for self-help social-development efforts.

Nevertheless, in this chapter they introduce a somewhat schematic distinction between "accommodationist" and "militant" Islamist groups—implicitly, those within civil society and those outside it. The former category frames the authors' rather sanguine account of the Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun) in Chapter 3. This is less an analysis of its evolution since the 1950s—a combination of state co-option and *embourgeoisement*—than it is a demand that the group be taken seriously as committed to working within the existing political system. In the authors' view, the Brotherhood has embraced a non-violent strategy for achieving the goal of an Islamic state by incremental, rather than revolutionary, methods; this includes an acceptance of pluralism, democratic institutions, and constitutional means for effecting political change. To this end, the Muslim Brotherhood has sought recognition as a political party. In the absence of this, it has participated in parliamentary elections in alliance with other parties, with some of its members unsuccessfully attempting to form a centrist party (Hizb al-Wasat). The Brotherhood has also sidestepped government restrictions on its activities in the formal political sphere by entering the leadership of Egypt's professional syndicates.

Such normative categorizations, however, come at risk of ignoring the flexibility and contingency characteristic of Islamist socio-political movements in Egypt—especially in their dealings with the state. Although benefiting from palace patronage in the 1930s and 1940s, they also developed links to the Free Officers who overthrew King Farouk in 1952. Indeed, the Brotherhood was actually quite a militant organization in the 1940s and 1950s—assassinating a prime minister, waging a paramilitary campaign against the British occupation of the Suez, and sending volunteers to fight the nascent Israeli state. Suppressed by Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1954 after an attempt on his life, the Brotherhood was rehabilitated in the 1970s by his successor, Anwar Sadat, who was looking for a counterweight to his leftist opponents. To be fair, the authors do recognize such issues. While Sadat's rapprochement with the Islamists has been discussed elsewhere, they provide a relatively detailed account—not previously available in the English-language secondary literature—of how it took place. Still, one wishes that they had

also included some explicit discussion of the role of patron–client relations and co-optation, long salient features of Egyptian political life, in structuring the dealings of successive governments with the Brotherhood.

By contrast, the militant and anti-government wing of the Islamist movement, discussed in Chapter 4, is implicitly represented as outside civil society by virtue of its recourse to violence and uncompromising rejection of the political status quo as apostasy (*kufr*). As with the Brotherhood, such groups initially received Sadat's tacit backing as a counterweight to the Egyptian left. After they had begun to outlive their usefulness in the late 1970s and early 1980s, however, the government attempted a crackdown of which Sadat's 1981 assassination was partially a consequence. The chapter focuses largely on those elements that have been previously discussed in the secondary literature: the Islamic Group (al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya), the Jihad Organization (Tanzim al-Jihad) and the so-called Denouncement and Holy Flight group (al-Takfir w'al-Hijra), otherwise known as the Society of Muslims (Jama'at al-Muslimin).

The authors' presumption that the militants are not part of civil society colors their analysis in a number of ways. To begin with, they focus too much on particular notorious organizations—for example, the Islamic Group and the Jihad Organization—that have clashed with the Egyptian state, while ignoring the broader stratum of Islamist networks from which the groups have drawn their supporters. Additionally, by uncritically referring to the Society of Muslims as “al-Takfir w'al-Hijra,” the authors reproduce a disparaging nickname attached to the group by the Egyptian press and government in what was probably an attempt to marginalize it. Names such as “Society of Muslims” and “Islamic Group,” by contrast, suggest a counter-strategy whereby the militants assert *their* claim to represent the Islamic mainstream. Finally, the authors have neglected the process by which Islamists have established themselves and function in particular settings—for example, in Upper Egypt or in the informal neighborhoods of Cairo. Particularly as seen from the bottom up, Egypt has an “uncivil society” that is worthy of closer examination and should not be consigned to the analytical fringes.

The authors pay particular attention to the issues of Islam and gender in the evolution of Egyptian civil society, arguing in Chapter 5 that there is no necessary contradiction between women's struggles for rights and freedoms and their adherence to a religious tradition in which they are represented as subservient. Indeed, even the socially conservative tendencies of Islamist women's activism strengthen civil society and the position of women in it. This is a complicated question, and some feminist scholars are likely to remain skeptical about the opportunities for women's empowerment within a male-dominated Islamist context in which they are regarded as “symbolic ‘cultural bearers’ of national tradition” (p. 116). Nevertheless, the authors make a convincing argument—especially in their case study on the multiple meanings of veiling—that Egyptian women will not be deterred from access to public life.

The concluding chapter returns to the theme—raised in earlier chapters and implicit in much of the book—of the Egyptian government as civil society's chief antagonist. Lacking in legitimacy and incapable of addressing the country's manifold social and economic problems, the military-dominated political order has not only sought to suppress the direct attacks of armed militants; it has also attempted to maintain its political hegemony by preventing the growth of any independent and participatory political space. All of this is indisputably true and, indeed, has rather negative implications for the well-being of Egyptian civil society in the near-term. Still, one wishes that the authors had better integrated this chapter with the rest of book, discussing systematically how governments have sought to suppress, co-opt, and otherwise fend off Islamist movements as part of such top-down strategies of control.

In short, *Islam in Contemporary Egypt* argues that the Islamist movement—as part of civil society—could be a positive force for a future democratic transition. However laudable, this claim is unfortunately made at the expense of a more diagnostic account of the historically complicated and ambiguous relationship between Islamists and governments that might, alterna-

tively, be understood as contributing to Egypt's surprisingly durable authoritarian political order.

MARC SCHADE-POULSON, *Men and Popular Music in Algeria*, Modern Middle-East Series No. 20 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1999). Pp. 250. \$35.00 cloth, \$12.76 paper.

REVIEWED BY TONY LANGLOIS, Department of Anthropology, Queen's University of Belfast

Rai is a form of popular music most closely associated with the city of Oran (Waharan) in the northwestern corner of Algeria. Marc Schade-Poulson's book considers the social significance of the genre in its place of origin and, in particular, its role in describing the complex gender relations prevailing there.

The first part of the book is rightly concerned with the cultural and political contextualizing of the field in question. Research was carried out over several visits to Oran in the 1980s and early 1990s, a period of increasing political instability that developed into a protracted war between the government and various factions of armed rebels who challenged its authority in the name of Islamic reform. The resulting cultural polarization, invoking often incompatible discourses on nationhood, modernity, and morality, inevitably influenced all expressive media and social practices in a profound way. Because popular music is often as responsive to economic and political developments as it is to nuances of taste, such studies can serve as valuable barometers of social change. In this case, *Rai* itself was a "problematic" idiom, drawing as it did on highly eclectic cultural sources, yet frequently employing the language and sentiments of the Oranaise demimonde.

Schade-Poulson's ethnography goes on to describe in detail the local processes of production and consumption of *Rai* music. We see the working relationships among singers, record producers, and musicians in Oran's studios. It is convincingly suggested that, because of the close physical distance between producers and consumers, the local distribution network is a crucial economic factor shaping the local recording industry. In music (as in other areas of the Algerian economy), it may be the personal negotiations between the record producers and the kiosk sellers that determine the commercial success of recordings, especially when new artists are involved. Obviously, one of the underlying reasons for the importance of personal transactions is a lack of faith in more extended systems of distribution and payment, which might, in turn, be linked to the ubiquitous inefficiency of formal economic systems in Algeria.

Rai is undoubtedly most consumed in its recorded form, and Schade-Poulson describes the social contexts in which young men relax and listen to and discuss music of all kinds. Apart from rare music festivals, live *Rai* is most frequently performed at wedding parties and in the "cabaret" nightclubs found outside Oran. These environments have very distinct moral connotations in Algeria, and Schade-Poulson does well to capture their flavors and show how they influence the performance and content of the songs in each context.

The larger part of the book analyzes the text of *Rai* songs, which the author divides into "dirty" and "clean" categories according to their thematic and linguistic content. The "dirty" songs, on the whole, were recorded in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the early years of "pop-*Rai*," when the genre's repertoire was drawn from the cabaret circuit and contained uncensored references to sex, drinking, and hashish-smoking. These recordings were often of very poor technical quality, many having been made in makeshift studios behind record shops. Propelled by initial commercial success from this private domain, songs were rapidly "cleaned up" in order to achieve approval for public broadcast and performance. Another impetus to this development was the increasingly conservative political environment resulting from the larger conflict taking place in the country.

Schade-Poulson argues that the song words, which frequently contain oblique and even contradictory imagery, are best understood in the setting of informal men's gatherings, where they seem to make sense of exclusively male experiences. In particular, Schade-Poulson has distilled through his textual analysis a typology of women (which includes "good," "bad," and "European," among others), and describes the kind of relationship and expectations that men have with each "type." The author shows how he developed his thesis by comparing several "readings" of a fixed selection of recorded songs. Various male informants provided these interpretations. *Rai* song texts, it emerges, are replete with expressions of desire, remorse, guilt, and betrayal and similarly employ a mixture of folk-religious imagery in which women are implicated in sorcery as well as duplicity. In a cultural context such as Algeria's, where most young men were both economically and politically powerless, where social expectations and confidence in institutions had been dashed, and where the country seemed headed for civil war, it is perhaps unsurprising that half-held superstitious discourse gained credibility. On the other hand, similar sentiments can be found in music produced across the border in Morocco, and they also have connections with other local genres of music. Perhaps it is more realistic to suggest that these ways of describing gender relations and emotions were an established part of the local vernacular that had been drawn into the public domain for a combination of contextual reasons.

Although I certainly agree with the author's premise that studies of the consumption of popular culture can contribute to anthropological understandings of a society, I am less convinced that the balance of topics Schade-Poulson has employed always does this the best service. Although Schade-Poulson looks in some detail at the content of the song lyrics themselves (an approach to *Rai* that is already exemplified by the works of Marie Virolle and Hadj Mili-ani), we do not learn as much about the music itself, its eclectic sources, and any significance that might be attached to its inclusion or exclusion. Perhaps this is because listeners tend to "notice" musical and linguistic elements that are unusual rather than typical.

Schade-Poulson's focus on the experience of informants themselves is enlightening, yet it does not answer all the questions that anthropologists may wish to ask—such as, Why do some people read different things into the same text? What is the relationship between popular culture and place? And how does music communicate non-verbal meanings in this context? Although this work is undoubtedly painstakingly researched, I would suggest that *Rai* bears more alternative meanings than are discussed here. To a large extent, Schade-Poulson's focus on gender issues is a result of the relatively narrow range of informants he has involved, and in a segregated society such as Algeria's this situation is almost inevitable. Nevertheless, even within the group of young men he was closest to, issues such as *Rai*'s problematic eclecticism, its regular references to specific sites in urban Oran, and the obvious political issues it came to avoid studiously (or did it, perhaps, obliquely allude to them?) were not raised here. The ways in which other, less enthusiastic local people felt about the music could have been explored in greater detail, even without going into the depth that was possible with these main informants.

In my own sojourn in Oran, I found not only that people employed clever or humorous lines from recent *Rai* songs in their everyday conversations, but that *Rai* songs very quickly "borrowed" the latest slang or pun from the street. Just as the record producers formed close working relationships with the distributors of the music, so the songs themselves reflected in an immediate way the local "in" jokes, which could never be directly translated out of context. Even Oran's most famous son, the singer Khalid, who was greatly admired for his success and talent, was accused of having "lost touch" with the people. His song words had become somehow less meaningful since he had left the country. Obviously, a record produced over six months ago on a different continent had a meaning to local listeners that was different from that of the one made a week earlier in a neighboring quarter. Elsewhere in Algeria, the Oranaise accent and dialect was considered a quite distinct marker of identity, and indeed the city had a "liberal" reputation nationally that brought other connotations to the consumption of *Rai* that

cannot be read directly from the “text” or be very salient to local consumers. In a period of extreme political division, when culture, identity, and language had become highly charged issues, I might have expected aspects of musical signification to have been afforded a little more weight than is apparent here.

What Schade-Poulson does extremely well is challenge the discourses about *Rai* that have emanated from the Western “world music” industry. *Rai* has often been “sold” in the West as a medium of resistance against the oppression of intolerant political, religious, or familial regimes. I agree wholeheartedly with the author that this view has much more to do with Western strategies to sell music to “youth” groups than anything from the North African experience of *Rai*. Schade-Poulson discusses in useful detail the influence, beneficial and otherwise, of the world-music industry on *Rai* and the negotiations its local producers have adopted to stay in business.

This book clearly fills an important ethnographic gap in the field. Few non-indigenous anthropologists have been attracted to the region (except Morocco), and the results of their research are rarely published in English. Schade-Poulson’s work, which sympathetically illustrates the experience of inhabiting a cultural space just beyond the margins of industrial Europe, sheds considerable light on indigenous morality and gender issues. For anthropologists, musicologists, and those interested in the current political and social landscape of the Maghrib, this book introduces important new terrain and will serve as a valuable introduction to Algerian popular culture.

YERACH GOVER, *Zionism: The Limits of Moral Discourse in Israeli Hebrew Fiction* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994). Pp. 222. \$49.95 cloth, \$19.95 paper.

REVIEWED BY DEBORAH A. STARR, Department of Near Eastern Studies, Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y.

This noteworthy book by Yerach Gover has been long overlooked. Gover demonstrates through his sophisticated analyses of selected Hebrew literary texts how Israeli liberal society constructs a moral conscience in bad faith. The book’s implicit and explicit critiques of Zionism have likely contributed to the lack of critical interest in this important study. Perhaps in the public airing of such issues, in both the Israeli press and academic circles, this book may gain the belated recognition it deserves.

One source of the bad faith Gover identifies lies in the socially sanctioned distinction between the construction of notions of rights and citizenship for Jews and Arabs in Israel. Jews’ rights are articulated in moral terms, while Arab citizenship is viewed through an entirely juridical frame. What has not happened, claims Gover, “is the recognition of a moral other in whose gaze the Jew would find him- or herself suddenly objectified as a Jew, made an essence in the face of the then existentially vital, subjective, and self-reflective Arab” (p. 32). The full recognition of the Arab as an “authentic moral being” (p. 29) would force Israeli society to confront its double standard and the moral ground on which Zionism has based its authority.

Gover maintains that Hebrew literary production has been closely tied to Zionism’s nation-building project. Thus, he identifies literary texts as a significant space in which Zionism’s moral inconsistencies play themselves out. Gover demonstrates how even Israeli Hebrew novels that attempt to engage in social critique are nevertheless circumscribed within the moral dilemmas posed by Zionism. To demonstrate this point, the author devotes nearly half of the book to a close reading of Yoram Kaniuk’s *A Good Arab* (1984), a novel that Gover identifies as representative of these literary works that position themselves as liberal investigations of the social ills but fall back into the discursive framework they are attempting to critique.

Kaniuk’s critically acclaimed novel was published under the awkward, somewhat Arabic-sounding pseudonym Yosef Sherara. The protagonist, who bears the fictive author’s name, identifies himself as a Palestinian Israeli Jew, the product of a marriage between a Holocaust

survivor and a Palestinian. Through this highly contrived characterization, Kaniuk attempts to launch a liberal, moral critique of Jewish–Arab affairs. Gover explains how, nevertheless, Yosef’s Arab character emerges in the novel “only as an object of the reader’s pity and in order to demonstrate the righteousness already present in Zionist liberalism. What Kaniuk has added is a willingness to listen to an Arab. This is a critical gain even though it is one that speaks fundamentally for the Jew” (p. 73). Gover’s careful analysis of the implied moral structure on which this novel is based demonstrates how the novel fails to expose the moral inconsistencies underpinning Zionist ideology.

The second section of the book contrasts the position of Kaniuk’s novel, taken as representative of mainstream Israeli literature representing a “leftist” Zionist ideology, to works by three somewhat marginalized *mizrahi*, or Arab Jewish authors. Although the works Gover examines—Shimon Ballas’s *The Other One* (1991), Sami Mikhael’s *Refuge* (1977) and *All Men Are Equal, But Some Are More* (1974), and Albert Swissa’s *Bound* (1991)—all enjoyed reasonable commercial success, the Israeli critical establishment relegated them to the category of “ethnic” literature. This categorization effectively identifies these works as outside the national-identity-building project to which the mainstream of Israeli Hebrew literature has been devoted. (It is worth noting that since the publication of Gover’s study, Sami Mikhael has become one of the most popular and critically acclaimed Israeli authors, requiring a re-evaluation of his status as a “marginal” writer.) It is precisely the outsider status attributed to these novels that intrigues Gover and provides these works the opportunity to engage in the sort of moral critique of Zionist principles at which Kaniuk’s novel fails. Yet after dedicating five chapters to close analysis of a single text, Gover implicitly reinscribes the marginalization of the three other authors by devoting a meager two chapters to analysis of their works.

Of the works examined in the second section, Swissa’s *Bound*, a collection of two short stories and one novella, attracts most of Gover’s attention. Swissa’s troubling narratives about children of Jewish immigrants from North Africa living in slums, are, according to Gover, all about resistance. This interpretation sets Gover at odds with the mainstream critical establishment that dismissed the book as sensationalistic and irrelevant because it lacked “explicit reference to context already taken as the essential frame for significant Israeli Hebrew literature” (p. 151). According to Gover’s reading, Swissa’s *Bound* confronts Zionism’s internal contradictions, particularly in holding a mirror up to the falsity of Israeli Jewish unity.

In other words, Gover concludes that Swissa—and to a lesser extent, another *mizrahi* author, Shimon Ballas—succeed where Kaniuk fails: “[d]espite itself, Kaniuk’s *A Good Arab*, reflects the hegemony of Zionism within Israeli Jewish culture; Mikhael presents a subaltern subject who internalizes hegemonic ‘structures of feeling’; Ballas’s and Swissa’s protagonists reflect the possibility of a counterhegemony. . . . In a sense, both Ballas and Swissa have produced authentic extranational, one is tempted to say postnational, novels. To that extent, they speak within and of a history that subsumes rather than merely opposes that of the Jews, and it is that history that Israeli culture ultimately must recognize if it is to produce works that are genuinely self critical in their moral reflection” (p. 192). For Gover, these works represent a hopeful beginning to a long-overdue process of Israeli moral self-critique.

Gover’s analysis obviously has significant implications with respect to the political foundations of the Israeli state and the continuing hold of Zionist ideology over its literary and cultural establishment, yet it does not read like a polemical tract. However, as in the passage quoted earlier, Gover’s insightful readings and well-founded arguments are too often obscured by dense language. Perhaps the difficulty of the prose—a problem that could easily have been solved by better editing—has limited the readership of the book and contributed to its marginalization. However, the undeterred reader will be rewarded by Gover’s solid scholarship and incisive criticism, which unmask the moral implications of Zionist ideology as reflected in contemporary Hebrew literature.

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